Ed Lake's notes
made while reading the 2,720 pages of supplementary documents
released when the Amerithrax Investigation Summary was released.

The FBI originally released 30 files in "document number" order, and that is
how I made my notes.  Later, the FBI added a 29 additional documents, and they
changed the order of everything to what it is now: each file is listed as "File xx of 59."
The notes show both numbers for files 1 through 30.

To assist the reader in finding my notes which correspond with a specific 01 to 59
document, you can click on a number below and it will take you to the matching document.

01 - 02 - 03 - 04 - 05 - 06 - 07 - 08 - 09 - 10
11 -12 - 13 - 14 - 15 - 16 - 17 - 18 - 19 - 20
21 - 22 - 23 - 24 - 25 - 26 - 27 - 28 - 29 - 30
31 - 32 -33 - 34 - 35 - 36 - 37 - 38 - 39 - 40
41 - 42 - 43 - 44 - 45 - 46 - 47 - 48 - 49 - 50
51 - 52 - 53 - 54 - 55 - 56 - 57 - 58 - 59

Amerithrax Misc. Documents

Doc. #847357
(a.k.a. "File 09 of 59") 

Pages 21 - 22 contain this information from a February 15, 2005 interview:

          XXXXX was less than impressed with the security at USAMRIID when [he] arrived there.  [He] was very concerned about safety.  [He] recalled that XXXXX once transported plague bacteria between buildings by the "VIP" method, which means "vial in pocket", instead of the proper packaging and transport procedures.

Page 37 contains a lot of personal information about Ivins as told to the FBI by someone else.  Ivins claimed he had been diagnosed as bipolar and schizophrenic, but that may have been his own diagnosis.  The "work with children" is also mentioned.

          IVINS discussed his own personal issues XXXXX.  He discussed the difficult relationship between himself and his wife, and difficulties with his teenage children.  He expressed insecurities about being without friends and being perceived as strange or weird.  IVINS indicated that he started to see a counselor.  Issues of depression, rampant insecurities, history of psychiatric illness in his family were also discussed by IVINS XXXXX.  According to XXXXX, IVINS was insecure personally, not professionally.

          IVINS informed XXXXX that he was labeled with bipolar and schizophrenic disorders; however, the disorder labels did not fit with XXXXX so XXXXX disregarded them.  XXXXX was not clear whether the labels were assigned by IVINS or his doctors.  XXXXX did not recall if XXXXX was aware of these labels.  XXXXX thought that IVINS had a personality disorder which did not cross into "frank psychosis."  Nothing in IVINS behavior made [her] worry about the technical aspects of his job performance.  His condition affected his social interactions; however, his disorder did not prevent his functioning at work, nor his community involvement and work with children.  IVINS was too critical of himself.  He analyzed every word said to him and all of the possible meanings implied by statements directed toward him.

Page 62 contains some details about the material that Dugway supplied for flask RMR-1029.

Page 64 contains some information by Ivins on producing spores and how many flask are needed:

          A folder entitled "Harvesting Spores - + GLP Spore From Dugway" contained "Acceptance Criteria Test Forms", which tested and plated RMR 1029 on March 18, 1998.  The last page featured an e-mail send from Ivins on January 17, 1997 to the following principle investigators: xxxxxxxxxx.  In the e-mail, Ivins calculated the amount of cultures needed and the time it would take to produce enough spores for aerosol challenges of 1000 rabbits and 200 monkeys.  Ivins concluded that the concentration of spores for each animal was based on what he and others in his group administered (or tried to administer) to the monkeys and rabbits in F96-16 and F97-17 or 3.0 E9.  Ivins prepared 8.5 milliliters of aerosol per animal, or about 8 milliliters per tube.  Ultimately, Ivins calculated that it took 13 runs to generate about 3.0 E12 Ames spores for the "current batch."  Since they needed ten times that amount, it would take them 130 runs with the flasks if performed with 2 liters per run, as they currently did.  Therefore, it would take 130 weeks at one run per week or 65 weeks at 2 runs per week.  The total amount of culture needed to produce the spores would be 260 liters. 

Pages 71 - 72 contain odd references to a bottle of olive oil.

Page 72 contains comments about destroying "spore challenge preparations" instead of keeping them.  Samples are destroyed by "double autoclaving."

Page 73 discusses an examination of Bruce Ivins' trash on April 1 and 5 of 2005.


Doc. #847359 (a.k.a. "File 20 of 59")

Page 3 is part of a June 6, 2008 interview where this is reported:

          Concerning the topic of BRUCE IVINS, XXXXX expressed that IVINS's own behavior since the anthrax investigation began has been self-destructive.  XXXXX pointed to IVINS's self initiated environmental sampling shortly after the anthrax mailings as an example of IVINS own self destructive behavior.  XXXXX characterized IVINS as a "fruitcake" and opined that IVINS has been somewhat of an antagonist for years at USAMRIID.  XXXXX explained that since the first Gulf War, IVINS and many other researchers at USAMRIID, because of the shift in research priorities, were forced basically to conduct many menial type laboratory tasks normally reserved for laboratory technicians, not Principal Investigators.  This shift in everyday work responsibilities and functions appeared to effect IVINS and he then appeared to be disgruntled at times. XXXXXXXXXXXXX  IVINS tended to internalize his frustration and would not confront anyone.  According to XXXXX, Ivins would hold a grudge and would not let it go.

Page 4 contains this:

          Upon being advised by the interviewing agents that some significant discrepancies had been identified pertaining to IVINS submission of various Ba slants in 2002 to the FBI repository (FBIR), XXXXX commented that IVINS may have just been "screwing with people's heads." XXXXXXXXXXX  advised that IVINS has been preparing slants for thirty-five (35) years.

Page 5 is one of several June 2008 interviews where people talk about Ivins not being at work.  They think he may have had a mental breakdown, and they worry about him.

Page 6 says that "Ivins is a conspiracy theorist and is someone who is very nervous and paranoid."

Page 8 is another instance where acetone is suggested as the drying agent for the attack spores.

Page 12 contains this from a May 28, 2008 interview:

          XXXXX opined that whomever mailed the anthrax-laced letters must have possessed and prepared the anthrax powder quite some time prior to September 11, 2001.  XXXXX was also of the opinion that if the anthrax-laced letters originated from USAMRIID then the act of preparing the anthrax powder and loading the envelopes would have to be done in a class 3 hood in Building XXXX.  Whomever perpetrated the mailings had to have tremendous knowledge pertaining to how to dry Ba.

Pages 15 - 17 contain an August 5, 2008 report which has more information about the Bacillus subtilis contamination.

Pages 18 - 21 contain an August 18, 2008 report about investigating foreign nationals in regarding the anthrax attacks.  No connections were found.

Pages 22 - 25 contain an interview from July 21, 2008 where the interviewee talks about hearing that Ivins had threatened to kill people at USAMRIID.


Doc. #847360 (a.k.a. "File 15 of 59") 

Pages 5 - 9 appear to be a March 6, 2006 report summarizing interviews with eight people who had access to Ames spores which matched the spores in the anthrax letters.

Page 12 says it takes from 1.5 to 2 hours to complete the autoclave process.

Page 37 mentions that it is possible to grow anthrax in a bioreactor.

Page 47 says:

A virulent, spore forming strain of BA would not be used in the fermenter because it would be a safety issue.  Due to the size of the fermenter, and the mess it created in the room where it was located, it would be impossible to ensure complete decontamination after use with a spore-former.  The fermenter was not portable, and was located in a room dedicated specifically for the fermenter.  In order to remove the fermenter, a wall would have to be removed.

Page 50 contains this:

          Ba spore growth in flasks with Leighton-Doi media and using the hot water bath/shaker apparatus typically occurred over a XXX duration.  XXXXX recalled occasional instances where, after starting the procedure on Friday, XXXXX returned on Monday to find the Ba vegetative cells had not exhausted their Leighton-Doi media nutrients and therefore had not gone under sporulation, or were in various stages of sporulation (i.e. a mix of vegetative cellls, cells undergoing sporulation and spores).  XXXXX also noted on other occasions vegetative cell growth was too rampant.  In situations like this, the Ba spores that were formed were of poor quality and "clumpy."  XXXXX advised the ratio of Ba vegetative cells to media volume was directly proportional to spore quality: too much Ba vegetative cells within a defined media volume results in poor Ba spore quality.  XXXXX advised it was standard procedure to allow the Ba vegetative cells to exhaust their nutritive supply in order to induce sporulation.

Page 58 says it takes "approximately one hour" to complete an autoclave cycle.

Page 66 says that geeky microbiologists who spend most of their time in laboratories are called "SCIF dwellers."

Page 76 is part of an August 28, 2006 interview where Ivins is described as going into a hysterical panic when he thinks that a shipment to him from Dugway may have been mistakenly delivered to somewhere else - where there was a report of anthrax arriving in the mail.  But that incident turned out to be a hoax, and Ivins' shipment arrived okay.

Pages 80 - 90 contain a September 6, 2006 report on the FBI's examination of Ivins' home computer, his work stations at USAMRIID and any loose media he possessed.  There is a long list of things he kept on file, including things about his fetishes that he kept in office workstation computers.  Nothing of tremendous interest in them, though.

Pages 91 - 96 contain a September 7, 2006 report on where the fermentors were located and used at USAMRIID.  There are about 10 fermetors of various sizes.


Doc. #847362 (a.k.a. "File 07 of 59")

Pages 24 - 28 contain an FBI report dated July 20, 2007, where they seem to be going back into USAMRIID to look for Bacillus subtilis spores.  The area to be sampled is about to undergo renovation, so they have to do their samplings quickly.

Pages 61 - 70 contain another FBI report from November 17, 2007, where they discuss the Bacillus subtilis contamination in the Brokaw and Post powders.  Evidently, the Bacillus subtilis was initially misidentified as a different species.  So, the FBI is going to do more searches of Ivins' home and work areas looking for any Bacillus species they can find.

Page 80 contains this observation from a December 14, 2007 interview:

XXXXX explained XXX theory in part by claiming that IVINS was not capable of the anthrax-laced mailings because IVINS is not capable of keeping his mouth shut and therefore would have told somebody by now.

Pages 84 - 87 appear to be a December 6, 2007 interview with someone at a health club where Ivins was a member.  The person being interviewed relates things about Ivins, including (apparently) some discussion with someone else at USAMRIID was getting porn emails from Russia addressed to Ivins.  Translating the Russian seemed to indicate that the site also had something to do with pharmaceuticals like Viagra.

Page 86 describes Ivins workout technique and his clothes, and describes an incident where a Navy Seal who was in a sauna with Ivins became enraged at the way Ivins was rubbing oil on his (Ivins' own) legs and interpreted it as a sexual advance. 

Pages 89 - 91 contain a January 8, 2008 interview where this is found on page 90:

XXXXX advised that the 5 1 fermentor, when operational, did not produce a whole lot of noise.  XXXXX opined that the easiest way to have produced the volume of Ba used in the anthrax-laced letter mailings would have been to use shaker flasks as opposed to using fermentors.  XXXXX expounded that using the shaker flask method to grow Ba would have been much less conspicuous because shaker flasks were always in use at USAMRIID anyway.  XXXXX advised that 8 one liter flasks could be run at the same time in a shaker incubator.  XXXXX believed that there is one shaker incubator, known in IVINS XXX laboratory and a second shaker incubator, known as "Big Bertha," in the XXX suites.

When using the fermentors, XXXXX recalled that it was standard operating procedures when growing Ba to use anti-foam in order to reduce the buildup of bubbles or foam that would occur during the fermentation process.   XXXXX explained that anti-foam would be automatically pumped into the fermentor to reduce the amount of bubbles.  XXXXX recalled that the old brand name for the anti-foaming agent was called Mazu and believed that Mazu may have been sold out or taken over by a newer company called Sigma.

Page 93 contains a comment from an interview where Ivins is described as "both an 'ideas guy' and a 'hands guy,' meaning that IVINS was able to come up with novel scientific ideas as well as had the laboratory skills to conduct the experiments to test his ideas."

Page 100 contains a comment from an interview where Ivins was "considered to be a pioneer in the field of spore preparations."

Page 101 contains this from a January 15, 2008 interview:

          XXXXX recalled IVINS being more upset than others on September 11, 2001.  IVINS thought that USAMRIID should be evacuated as he believed the last un-accounted highjacked airplane was headed for USAMRIID.  XXXXX recalled IVINS saying, "We got to get out of here."

Page 105 contains part of a February 6, 2008, interview where this is reported:

          XXXXX was not aware of any significant concerns that IVINS may have had or voiced regarding the notion that anthrax research and/or specifically rPA research was going away prior to the September 11, 2001 time frame.  XXXXX re-iterated that IVINS's funding in the period of time preceding the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001 was stable and IVINS should not have been concerned.  XXXXX opined that maybe IVINS had assumed that he was no longer going to be able to conduct anthrax research but XXXXX can not be sure of what IVINS was thinking at the time.  XXXXX advised that "[IVINS] would often make assumptions that were not necessarily true." 

 Page 105 contains this:

XXXXX opined that XXX is not sure whether USAMRIID researchers benefitted or not as a result of the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001.  XXX feels that the anthrax mailings actually hurt USAMRIID employees in that a significant increase in research dollars became available resulting in a significant increase in competition as well.  XXX stated that "All kinds of people came out of the woodwork."  The entire research environment surrounding the biological defense community became more competitive.  XXXXX named the Navy, Air Force and the National Institute of Health as examples of the new competitors.

 Page 107 contains some comments about the odd hours Ivins spent in the hot suites during the times the anthrax letters would have been prepared.


Doc. #847373 (a.k.a. "File 24 of 59")

Pages 1 - contain a September 29, 2006 report where various routines at USAMRIID are described.

Page 3 has this:

          There was no consistent method for the disposal of materials, as many researchers would autoclave their own waste, while others would leave items in or around the autoclave until it reached capacity.

Pages 6 - 8 contain an October 2, 2006 report where the usage of materials taken from flask RMR-1029 is analyzed.

Page 9 mentions that AFTER 9/11, an "Elite Rover Observer Force (EROF) was created.  It consisted of soldiers who would make unannounced visits to BL-2 and BL-3 labs to see if anything unusual was going on.

Page 10 says that the EROF became less important after video cameras were installed, but there are still a lot of labs in building 1412 which do not have video cameras.

Page 10 also seems to say that biosafety suits are NOT generally used in BL-3 suites.

Page 12 mentions Ivins' fascination with attractive female FBI agents.  Plus, it mentions that some extra security keypads and measures were added to his lab after 2001.

Pages 47 - 54 contain a November 6, 2006 report where the Bacillus subtilis contamination of the Post and Brokaw letters is mentioned.  They hunt for a source.  The Bacillus subtilis in the Brokaw and Post letters was identical, but the DNA did not match 70 other samples tested.

Pages 56 - 57 contain information about the lyophilizer, how Ivins acquired it, but it was rarely used and even less rarely cleaned.  It was noisy to operate.

Page 58 mentions that someone using Ivins' home computer did a lot of reverse look-ups trying to find the geographical location for certain phone numbers.  Most produced negative results, and the ones that got positive results seem to be places like Blockbuster and a Nissan dealership.

Pages 61 and 62 describe some of Ivins' emails.

Pages 69 - 73 contain a December 21, 2006 report where personal computer usage at Ft. Detrick is discussed.  Ivins had a Mac lap-top which he evidently moved around from room to room, including "hot" rooms.  It may have been turned over to others to use.


Doc. #847375 (a.k.a. "File 19 of 59")

Pages 1 - 16 have to do with Ivins' cars and his driver's licenses.

Pages 23 - 30 contain an April 20, 2005 interview with a USAMRIID employee.  On page 25, he states that he knows how to dry spores but thinks that the dried spores would have be ground up before being put in the letters.

From page 29:

          There are probably places where someone could have grown Ba without anyone knowing because there were multiple incubators which multiple people used for different projects.  One individual would not necessarily have known what another individual was working on at a particular time.

Page 31 says, "IVINS was granted Top Secret clearance on July 14, 2004.

Pages 34 - 44 contain more information about Ivins' geneology and a lot of information from obituaries.


Doc. #847376 (a.k.a. "File 27 of 59")

Pages 1 - 27 contain a May 24, 2005 summarization of the two incidents where Ivins performed unauthorized clean ups at USAMRIID.  It's an assessment of his motivation and his actions.  REALLY INTERESTING STUFF!

Page 3 contains information that Ivins examined the Daschle letter under a hood, NOT inside a biosafety cabinet.

          IVINS stated that the contents of the letter contained a powder that was unlike anything he had ever dealt with previously.  Upon examination, the powder contained in the letter seemed to float easily in the air.  IVINS was surprised by the fineness of the powder and stated that "it floated around inside the hood like dust in the sunlight."   Ivins stated that due to the ease at which the powder became airborne, USAMRIID personnel should have conducted testing within a laboratory that bore an overhead containment hood.

Page 4 contains this:

IVINS disagreed with XXXXX processing of the Daschle letter in Room XXX as the BSL-2 laboratory was not adequate to contain aerosolized B.a. powder.

Starting at the bottom of page 6 and continuing into page 7 there is a long comment by the FBI agent writing the summary where he demonstrates that Ivins' stated motivations do not match his actions in the two cleanup incidents.

            Ivins' justifications of his actions following the independent sampling contradicted his explanation of motives for conducting the survey in the first place.  If truly motivated by concern of contamination on the cold-side of USAMRIID, upon evidence of such contamination, why did Ivins not pursue more extensive methods toward correcting the problem?  How would improper handling of B.a. samples be corrected without passing along information that the current containment system was not working properly?  Why even conduct the survey in the first place if he did not want to cause alarm, especially if he suspected that he would find contamination?  Ivins had the courage to conduct the swabbing without command approval, yet lacked the initiative to inform the appropriate authorities when the results were presumptively positive?  Ivins was obviously concerned enough about possible contamination to knowingly violate USAMRIID protocol, yet at the moment his concerns were validated, he took no actions toward addressing the problems for the benefit of USAMRIID.

            If motivated by a concern for Friend, why did Ivins not inform her of the presumptive positive results from her desk?  Ivins confirmed during an interview that he did not inform Friend of his findings; however, the reasons for not telling Friend were not provided.  The assessment by Ivins that the level of contamination within the office was not a health risk to himself or to Kristie Friend did not diminish the significance of finding contamination outside of the hot suites.

Page 21 has this:

          On June 18, 2002, at 9:00 p.m., IVINS sent [Linscott] a message indicating that "the FBI people who talked to me (right after I found the break in containment and got crucified for it) said they thought my coming back to work after hours was 'extremely suspicious.'  I don't think anyone has any idea how peaceful and quiet it can be here after hours.  I can come here and just sit, or read, or get on the web.  If XXXX is being bothersome I can go back into B5 or even into B3.  (In the evenings, B3 might as well be Mars.  I can just sit and think and relax from everything.)  Also, it's just a great time to get work done without hassle.  It used to be honorable and commendable to work more than 8 hours a day.  Now, it's suspicious ... " 

Page 28 has this:

BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS was granted four hours of annual leave on September 17, 2001.  [I think it was a psychiatry appointment.]

Page 38 - 40 contain a June 7, 2005 report on what medication Ivins was taking around the times of the attacks.   He was taking drugs for depression and schizophrenia.  

Page 41 is the start of a report tracing Ivins' family tree.  There are pages of obituaries of Ivins family members after the report.   Thru page 49.

Page 54 shows two patents issued to Ivins as co-inventor.  Descriptions of the patents are on the pages that follow.  Thru page 75.

Page 76 contains information about trying to track Ivins' computer usage.  On this report it says he didn't use AOL from home.

Page 77 - 96 contain details about the "4th International Conference on Anthrax, held in Annapolis, Maryland from June 10 thru 13, 2001." 

The conference was organized by scientists from the United States Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), namely XXXXX and BRUCE IVINS.

Page 97 describes surveillance put on Dr. Ivins' home on July 28, 2005. 

Page 99 - 102 contain a July 18, 2005 report where Ivins' state of mind is evaluated by analyzing a book that Ivins claimed got him interested in science: "Arrowsmith," by Sinclair Lewis.  The person writing the reports says,

Martin Arrowsmith, the protagonist, learns that, in order to ensure his experimental plague vaccine works, he must allow some people to die of plague instead of immunizing them.  Arrowsmith's mentor, Max Gottlieb, teaches him that people have to die in the short run in order for the world as a whole to be saved in the long run.  In addition, Gottlieb takes a cynical view of the world, and feels that it may not be worth saving in the first place, with its unlovable people and overcrowded conditions.  This satirical novel presents Arrowsmith's and Gottlieb's view of society and how they, as scientists, must be more loyal to the search for truth and scientific breakthroughs than to soft-heartedness and temporary solutions.

Pages 103 - 107 describe an analysis done on July 16, 2004 through July 23, 2004, apparently to see if every movement in and out of the hot suites and other areas of the buildings was properly recorded in the key card logs.  They also noted if people in a room would easily notice someone else entering the room. 


Doc. #847377 (a.k.a. "File 03 of 59")

Page 31 contains a few details about flask RMR-1029.

          When growing spores for challenges, IVINS' group used seed stock from the original Ames slant.  At one time, material that had been grown from the original slant was sent to Dugway Proving Ground for quick, mass production of spores.  There was no real difference between the spores made at USAMRIID and those made at Dugway; Dugway was simply about to produce spores more quickly.  There was a lot of work involved in the preparations of spores, including growth in a flask and the use of Renograpfin.  IVINS' group used the material received back from Dugway, as well as Ames they had grown themselves, for aerosol challenges.

Page 33 contains a 2/22/2005 explanation of why Ivins used the name "kingbadger7" in emails.

Page 34 contains a lot of information related to Gary Matsumoto's books and articles about Vaccine A.

Pages 36 - 47 appear to be a Gary Matsumoto article.

Pages 48 - 57 appear to be a Gary Matsumoto article from Vanity Fair. 

Pages 72 - 99 contain a January 11, 2006 summary of matters related to flask RMR-1029 and lots of details about challenges.

Page 74 describes what a nebulizer is used for.

Page 75 describes an "Aerosol chamber" and an "All Glass Impinger."

Page 77 contains this:

          It was documented during several interviews that Ivins' group did not keep room XXX very clean and tidy.  Post-challenge agar plates were left on counters, the incubators were left full of material, samples in the refrigerator were not disposed of in a timely manner, and "hot" trash was allowed to build up for weeks prior to being autoclaved.  One former military aerobiology technician XXXXX commented that XXXXX had to clean Ivins' trash himself out of safety concerns.  XXXXX said that civilians at USAMRIID did not take safety seriously.  XXXXX commented that when XXXXX looked at agar plates that had sat in the biohazard trash bags for several days or weeks in 115, they were covered with bacterial growth.

Pages 95 and 96 describe using olive oil as an alternative to antifoam.


Doc. #847379 (a.k.a. "File 16 of 59")

Pages 13 - 15 contain a March 3, 2003 interview which describes a lot of details about the handling of the various anthrax letters and how some things were not documented.

Page 19 is a November 26, 2001 memorandum regarding "Possible Anthrax Exposures."  It seems to relate to the handling of the letters at USAMRIID.

There are various comments in the interviews about the lyophilizers at USAMRIID.  Ivins seems to have been in charge of one of them, and no one could use it without getting his permission.

Pages 37 - 38 contain this from an April 24, 2003 interview:

          XXXXX advised that a speed vac, an instrument used to precipitate deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), can be used as an alternative to a lyophilizer for drying material.  Speed vacs can only be used for very small samples, such as those that could be contained in an Eppendorf tube.  An older speed vac is located in Suite XXX but it does not work very well.  A newer speed vac was brought into Suite XXX recently, and there are a number of speed vacs located throughout USAMRIID.


Doc. #847380 (a.k.a. "File 21 of 59")

Page 2 is part of a March 28, 2003 interview where the handling of the Daschle letter is discussed along with the contamination that Ivins claimed resulted from mishandling.

Page 3 contains a description of Ivins working with anthrax.  Page 3 also contains this:

'Normal' Ames appears pale gray, with medusa-like colonies, when plated and is not hemolytic.  With aging, the culture becomes grainy and blebs appear.  Ames mutants appear yellow in color an display hemolytic activity.  If a person did not know better, he might mistake the mutant material as not anthrax.

Pages 12 - 13 are part of a May 28, 2003 interview and contain this:

          XXXXX opined that the Ames strain used in the Anthrax mailings could have come from USAMRIID, but XXXXX believed that it would not have been taken from USAMRIID in dry form.  XXXXX advised that XXXXX believes a person would have had to have taken a small amount of B.a. Ames, and would have had to grow the B.a. on their own.  XXXXX said that they could grow it using a blood agar and washing it with water three to five times.  XXXXX related in order to achieve a high quality the spores could be washed up to fifteen times.  XXXXX stated that in order to dry B.a., solvent methods could be utilized rather than another drying process.  In this way, the B.a. would not have to be milled to achieve a powder form.  XXXXX related that as soon as B.a. is dried it is a highly dangerous substance.

Page 26 is part of a July 22, 2003 report which mentions someone name Bassett who "grows XXX own B.a. Ames spores using the Leighton-Doi method."

Pages 28 - 29 describe the handling of the Brokaw letter. 

Page 30 contains this from May 13, 2003:

          The analysis of the Daschle letter began immediately upon its arrival.  One container had two bottles of fluid from a preliminary hand-held analysis of the letter after it was opened in the Hart Senate Office Building.  Some of this fluid was removed and sent for Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) analysis and to XXXXX.

Page 31 describes some of Ivins' handling of the Daschle letter along with details of how the letters were irradiated to kill the anthrax.

At the bottom of page 31 is this:

          The B.a. from the New York Post letter was granular and appeared to be a number of different colors.  When B.a. is centrifuged, it appears to be brown at the bottom of the tube, tan in the middle, and a lighter color or white at the top of the tube.  If the material is left to dry in the tube and then ground up, it would appear to be different colors.  With regard to the New York Post and Brokaw material, XXXXX thinks that the mailer either did not know how to do the final purification step or that they pulled the wrong tube of material to use first.


Doc. #847382 (a.k.a. "File 11 of 59")

Pages 9 - 11 contain parts of a June 6, 2003 interview where the interviewee discussing all sorts of aspects of decontamination. 

Page 13 contains this:

The FBI photographed the letters in the Veterinary Medicine room across the hallway from XXXXX.  XXXXX advised that there were flat tables in the Veterinary Medicine room that were ideal for photographing the evidence.  XXXXX recalled that the letters were contained in double ziploc bags while being photographed.  This activity took place after normal business hours, and XXXXX a number of technicians, and many FBI personnel were present at the time.

Page 32 contains some information about the operation of a lyophilizer.


Doc. #847384 (a.k.a. "File 14 of 59")

Pages 28 & 29 are part of a December 2, 2003 report which uses a different time-line for when the letters may have been mailed:

Time-Line First Mailing (5:00 p.m., 9/17/2001 through 8 p.m., 9/18/2001. 

Time-Line Second Mailing (3:30 p.m., 10/06/01 through 11:00 a.m., 10/09/01

Page 49 has this about an August 12, 2003 interview:

          There is a fifteen-hour and twenty-minute period from 4:48 p.m. 9/17/2001 until XXXXX enters via "IN" access to building XXXX at USAMRIID at XXXX pm 9/18/2001.  No records were reviewed which can demonstrate XXXXX whereabouts for the fifteen-hour twenty-minute period.  XXXXX stated in an interview that to the best of XXX recollection, XXXXX was home all night on 9/17/2001.

          On XXXXX entered "IN" building XXXX of USAMRIID and XXXXX finally exited "Out" of building XXXX at XXXXX a Fort Detrick vehicle acquired by BRUCE IVINS at 7:42 a.m. as per motor-pool records, to XXXXX.  The vehicle was returned to Fort Detrick motor-pool at 3:42 p.m. on 9/18/2001.


Doc. #847386 (a.k.a. "File 28 of 59")

Page 2 is from a December 10, 2003 interview where this appears:

          XXXXX has occasionally worked late while at USAMRIID.  DR. BRUCE IVINS is the only person that XXXXX could identify who frequently works at USAMRIID during late evening hours.  XXXXX remembers IVINS was in Suite XXX of Building XXXX sometime after September 11, 2001, working with an envelope that XXXXX heard was used in the anthrax mailings.  IVINS was accompanied by a group of individuals with whom XXXXX was unfamiliar.

Pages 4 - 6 from a December 18, 2003 interview contain this:

XXXXX does not use New Sporulation Media (NSM) or Modified G media.  XXXXX believes that Ivins uses modified growth media to obtain a higher yield of spores.  This modified growth media is nutrient deficient, causing vegetative cells to produce spores sooner.  XXXXX thinks that this modified growth media may possibly be Modified G.

Page 12 is the beginning of a report dated January 6, 2003, where Ivins evidently pointed to a co-worker as possibly being the anthrax mailer.  But, evidently, the FBI finds no reason to believe that.  The report ends on page 15.

Pages 13 and 14 describe the time-lines the FBI was using to determine if someone had an alibi for the time needed to drive from Frederick MD to Princeton and back:

Time-line First Mailing (4:30 p.m., 09/17/2001 through 11:30 a.m., 09/18/2001

Time line Second Mailing (4:30 p.m., 10/06/2001 through 11:30 a.m., 10/09/2001

Pages 32 and 33 contain this information from an October 31, 2003 interview:

     XXXXX was called by XXXXX to accompany XXXXX out front of building XXXX about one month after the anthrax-laced letters were mailed.  XXXXX was outside on the front walk.  BRUCE IVINS and XXXXX soon joined the group.  XXXXX wanted to "show them something."  XXXXX opened a brown briefcase containing several jars with what XXXXX stated was simulant.  Each jar had different types of white particles and XXXXX was inquiring as to which simulant was most like the actual evidence found in the letters.  IVINS stated that the one that looked like "smoke in a glass" looked like the actual evidence.

Page 49 has this from a January 14, 2004 interview:

          Approximately every ten-days XXXXX the various suites.  XXXXX and on occasion picks up trash and drags laundry into the suites for autoclaving.  XXXXX stated that after the passbox incident all of the used scrubs, socks and towels are returned to the hot suites and sterilized with steam before they are taken away to be laundered.  This change took place after the laundry companies expressed concern with possible bacterial contamination of the laundry and potential threat to their employees.


Doc. #847399 (a.k.a. "File 08 of 59")

Pages 40 - 41 contain this from a January 26, 2004 interview:

If someone wanted to remove select agents from the hot zone, XXXXX identified three possible methods to remove the agents from the hot zone.  First, someone could pass the select agent through the "Pass Box".  The "Pass Box" is utilized to pass laboratory notebooks from the hot zone to the clean zone.  The notebook inside the hot zone is placed inside the box.  The box door is closed and UV lights inside the box are turned on.  After the UV treatment, the notebook is removed from the box on the clean side.  Second, someone could carry the select agent through the decontamination shower.  After showering, the individual could hide the select agent material in their street clothes before exiting the decontamination area.  Third, an individual could place the select agent inside the autoclave from the hot zone.  A person could place a select agent inside the autoclave, but not turn it on.  Once through the decontamination shower, the person could open the autoclave on the clean side and remove the select agent.

Pages 44 - 56 contain both the questions and the answers for one person, giving the only illustration of what questions were being asked in what order.


Doc. #847406 (a.k.a. "File 12 of 59")

Page 2 is part of a March 16, 2004 interview where the interviewee says that anyone who worked with anthrax could learn how to weaponize it if they wanted to.  He says that there is a building at Ft. Detrick that is so contaminated that it has been boarded up for almost 30 years.  Every once in a while they go into it to see if it is still thoroughly contaminated, and they verify that it still is.

Pages 8 - 9 contain this:

          XXXXX said that XXXXX had seen the post-challenge plates of B.a Ames after they had been sitting in room XXX of Building XXXX at USAMRIID for an extended amount of time in the trash bags.  XXXXX described the plates as being completely covered with growth.

Page 15 contains a lot of information about what happens after autoclaving.  The material is tossed into a dumpster.  It also has a lot of information about how the air inside hoods is filtered.

Page 19 contains a lot of information about storing the bags prior to autoclaving.  They'd evidently sit around until they became an "obstruction." 

          At the end of the aerosol challenge approximately six (6) or seven (7) ml of B.a. would remain.  The B.a. that was not used in challenges was normally autoclaved prior to being removed from the hood.  The remaining material, except for the AGIs, that was used in the challenge would be placed into a bag and autoclaved at the end of the day.  The AGIs were sprayed with bleach prior to being removed from the hood line, and then taken to room XXX for plating.  After the plates had been left in the incubator overnight, they would be completely covered with growth.  The plates were then read in the morning following a challenge.  After the plates were read, they were placed into a bag and clearly marked with what pathogen was in the bag, what strain the pathogen was, and who the investigator was.  The bags would remain in room XXX until nearly overflowing, or until the number of bags in the room became an obstruction.  The bags often sat in room XXX for several days or weeks prior to being removed.  XXXXX noted that XXXXX was fascinated with how much growth appeared on the plates after several days or weeks.  The bags were taken to the basement to be autoclaved.  The bags were placed into metal garbage cans in the basement, next to the autoclave, in case there was a leak in the bag.

Page 31 is part of an April 15, 2004 interview where the interviewee feels very strongly that BioPort was somehow involved in the anthrax attacks.

Page 37 is part of another interview where the interviewee points the finger at BioPort.  The interview takes place on  in March 26, 2004. 

          XXXXX thought that to prepare the spores one might need to use acetone extraction and good filtration to get rid of any cellular debris or it might not work.

Page 46 has this:

The civilian scientists thought the military scientists' "intelligence was proportional to their hair length".


Doc. #847408 (a.k.a. "File 18 of 59")

In just about every interview, the interviewee is asked if they ever worked with "modified G sporulation media."

Page 15 contains this:

XXXXX in the past olive oil was used for aerosol challenges.  The olive oil was used for challenges involving toxin proteins.  Olive oil has not been used during challenges for ten (10) years.

Page 40 - 41 contains this from Feb. 13, 2004:

          USAMRIID was originally built to accommodate 325 employees, and it now houses 750 employees with a planned expansion to 1000 employees.  More laboratory space is needed to accommodate all of the additional testing that is being conducted.  Animal studies have increased threefold and aerosol challenges have increased fivefold.  In addition, medical product and evaluation studies have increased.  A knowledge center including a library is being planned for the new campus.  This center is meant to facilitate the exchange of information among various agencies.

The interviewee then discussed other interesting things about USAMRIID's history, including personnel problems in the late 1980s and early 1990s.      

Page 42 contains this:

          XXXXX does not think that the B.a. contained in the letters was made at USAMRIID because they do not have the equipment necessary to produce spores of that quantity.  XXXXX intuition is that the material was spray dried, which is a common way to dry pharmaceuticals, and USAMRIID does not have a spray dryer.  The media could still be smelled in the B.a, and that would not have been the case if the material had been lyophilized as the aromatics are lost when an agent is vacuum dried.   The B.a in the letters would have had to be prepared at DPG or passed on intentionally.

Page 50 mentions that if you piggy-backed when entering a room and then swiped your card when leaving, the security people who know you piggy-backed.  (Since many people say that piggy-backing occurred all the time, the security evidently never did this kind of check.)

Everyone seems to agree that getting materials out of the building was NOT a problem.

In these early interviews there are many mentions of "Sterilite containers" and questions about whether the interviewees ever used them.

Pages 75 - 106 contain a May 15, 2004 description of the lots which were combined to create the contents of flask RMR-1029.  And there are a lot of other details about flask RMR-1029.  All the information is summarized out of Ivins' notebooks.

Page 83 says:

Based on the observations, there were >99% refractile spores, <1% vegetative cells, <1% non-refractile spores, and <1% debris in RMR 1029 as of 3/17/98.


On 3/16/99, Ivins checked the viability counts for RMR 1029.  XXXXXXX  and incubated overnight.  The viability was determined to be 2.3 - 2.4 x 10 [to the tenth] cfu/ml.  This viability was in comparison to that obtained on 10/22/97 which was 3.6 x 10 [to the tenth] cfu/ml.

Page 106 says "that the purpose of heat shocking was to stimulate germination and get rid of vegetative debris."


Doc. #847411 (a.k.a. "File 23 of 59")

Pages 1 - 5 describe a June 3, 2004 interview with a former Ft. Detrick employee who says mentions "hood lines numbered one (1) and two (2), which were utilized for the aerosol exposures" were in Building 1412.

The material provided by IVINS was heat shocked in Room XXX of Building 1412.  IVINS brought the material for the aerosol challenges to Building 1412 in a stainless steel container.  The steel container had an autoclavable bag inside containing a double bagged bottle of the anthrax solution.


XXXXX stated that ten (10) milliliters of material were needed for an aerosol challenge.

Page 2 contains this about work in Building 1412:

At the end of the day, all material from the aerosol challenges was autoclaved.  XXXXX the cleaning process after an aerosol challenge was taking one (1) to two (2) hours.  It took ninety (90) minutes to run the autoclave in the hood lines.

Page 3 mentions a bottle of olive oil.  The interviewee never saw a bottle of olive oil in building 1412. 

Page 19 mentions a bottle of olive oil.  The interviewee "has seen a glass bottle of Italian olive oil in one of the aerosol rooms at USAMRIID, however, could not recall exactly where." 

Page 20 says the interviewee "guessed that oil could be placed onto the o-rings to help them slide on and off the piping."

Page 30 has this about procedures in Building 1412:

If the autoclave is in use, the bagged materials are left under the hood until the autoclave is ready for another load.  The materials from the studies are either in the autoclave or under the hood; it never leaves the hot suite without being autoclaved.  Only animal carcasses are taken out of the hot suite without autoclaving.  Protocol maintains that the carcasses be transported to the animal room in the basement of Building 1412 to be autoclaved.

Page 33 has this:

XXXXX never introduced olive oil to the aerosol challenge process.

and this

XXXXX had never heard of using olive oil as an alternative to antifoam

Page 37 is part of another interview with someone who mentions olive oil:

XXXXX had heard that olive oil could be used in the aerosol process, however, XXXXX never used it.  XXXXX believed that there might have been a small glass bottle of olive oil in the cabinet in room XXX of Building 1412.  XXXXX could not recall the brand of oil.

Page 49 mentions an October 22, 1997 email from Ivins and goes into details of things which appear to be related to the preparation of the contents of flask RMR-1029.

There are more mentions of "modified G sporulation media" in this .pdf file.


Doc. #847413 (a.k.a. "File 26 of 59")

Information from August 24, 2004 about things stored in freezers at Ft. Detrick.


Doc. #847418 (a.k.a. "File 01 of 59")

Page 8 mentions "Modified G media," which I think I've seen mentioned elsewhere. On November 2, 2004, a former USAMRIID employee is asked if he ever used it.

Page 13 of the same interview as above mentions "Good Laboratory Practices" work.

Pages 16 - 17 contain a November 18, 2004 report where someone is investigated and the agents can find absolutely nothing pointing to him as possibly being the anthrax mailer.   

Pages 18 - 19 describe a September 20, 2004 meeting where USAMRIID agrees to allow all of its computers to be examined by the FBI.  There's this on page 18:

          IVINS advised that there is a laptop computer on his hand receipt, however he has never used it and cannot locate the computer.

Pages 20 -21 are about an April 2 and April 6, 2004 collection of Ames strain samples at Ft. Detrick.  Ivins seems to have a hard time finding things.

Page 23 again has the FBI asking someone if they've ever used Modified G sporulation media.

Page 25 talks about hoods laying around USAMRIID and gossip that XXXXX had taken one of the hoods.  Hoods?   They're used instead of biosafety cabinets.  It looks like they are desks where there's a sheet of glass between the user and the materials, much like at a serve-yourself buffet to make sure you don't spit or breath on anything.  The area below the glass is totally open for your hands to manipulate equipment.

Page 30 has this information:

Details:  Data from aerosol challenges involving Bacillus anthracis (Ba) for the time period August 1998 to September 1999 was analyzed to determine potential windows of opportunity for removal of post-challenge Ames during a ten-day period following each aerosol challenge.  It was estimated based upon spore concentrations of material used that any aerosol challenge involving greater than or equal to three animals would constitute enough available Ba to have assembled the anthrax-laced letters.  All Ames challenges in the time period for which key card access records are available involved at least three animals.

Page 31 uses the term "hood line" which I gather is a line of "hooded" work areas.

Page 37 has another mention of someone being asked about "modified G sporulation media."

Pages 40 - 46 seem to be a December 1, 2004 "project" to document everyone at Ft. Detrick who handled the anthrax letters and envelopes as part of the FBI investigation.

Yup.  Page 41 steps though every detail about the handling of the Daschle letter day by day beginning on October 15, 2001.


          XXXXX gave a ziploc bag containing the Daschle letter and envelope to Bruce Ivins, who took the ziploc into Suite B3, Room XXX to perform a concentration count.  XXXXX returned the ziploc containing the letter and envelope to XXXXX.

Page 42 says they have all the letters on December 9, 2001.

The Brokaw letter begins its handling on 10/12/2001.  It first goes to the NYC health department, then to the CDC in Atlanta.   It gets to USAMRIID on October 14.

Page 43 says "Scent was extracted from the letter and envelope by PST [Physical Science Technician] XXXXX in Room XXX Building 1412."

After all the envelopes are assembled on December 9, they are turned over to SA XXXXX of the Trace Evidence Unit.

The New York Post letter begins its handling on October 19, 2001.  It says the letter was removed from the envelope and repackaged in double sealed bags.  The anthrax powder was removed and placed in XXXXX.

Page 44 says the Post envelope and letter were delivered to USAMRIID on October 20, 2001.   The letter and envelope are irradiated on October 23.

On 10/26/2001 "Scent was extracted from the letter and envelope by PST XXXXX ..."  DNA, fingerprint and ink examinations are performed.

Page 45 describes the handling of the Leahy letter.  It reaches USAMRIID on Dec. 5, 2001.  On page 46 there is this:

At 11.00 a.m. [on December 9, 2001] FBI employee XXXXX (now a Special Agent) extracted scent from the Leahy letter and envelope at FBI headquarters.

All four letters and envelopes were received from the FBI Laboratory on 01/16/2003 by SA XXXXX and SA XXXXX and have been stored in a locked safe since their receipt.  The safe is currently located at the Northern Virginia Resident Agency (NVRA) in the Amerithrax squad area in the office of SA XXXXX and SA XXXXX.

Page 56 contains this:

          XXXXX does not really know the "ins and outs" of Building 1412 of USAMRIID.  XXXXX impression was that there were areas of the building which were not used on a regular basis and which could have been used without drawing attention.

Page 58 contains this:

XXXXX never heard of modified G sporulation media.

Page 59 contains this:

          There was much "piggy-backing" going on in entering and exiting the facility.  When an employee opened the door, others entered the facility without entering their individual assigned personal codes.  XXXXX was unaware of any visiting scientists being taken into the hot areas by USAMRIID researchers; however, employees used the piggy-backing method to enter and exit the "hot" areas.  XXXXX understood hot areas to be any area which was actively being utilized for research purposes and not areas which were already decontaminated and "dark."

When asked how someone might covertly remove select agents from the facility, XXXXX replied there were several ways.  The first was to use the "dunk-tank," which was filled with bleached water.  An employee could properly seal up an item and dunk the item into the water for decontamination.  The same employee can then exit the facility and retrieve the item from the other side of the tank, especially during after-hours when no others were present.  The second method was to use the "pass box," a compartment built into the wall with UV lights.  An employee can easily turn off the UV lights by turning off a switch from the inner walls of the facility.  An employee can pass the item through the box from the inner walls and retrieve the item from the outer walls.  The third method was for an employee to simply take a vial or a small container and hold it in his or her hands while taking a shower.  If there are no others in the facility, this method can be used easily.  The last method was to simply walk out of the facility.  XXXXX agreed that employees are rarely challenged.  The only time someone is challenged was if people with no reason or access wandered around.  Many employees probably disregarded some of the safety procedures in place at the facilty.

Page 63 mentions Oliver Perry Mikesell and how he died of alcoholism after the anthrax mailings.  Mikesell had also worked with powdered anthrax at Battelle.

Page 73 - 76 are "a summary of the investigative efforts into the water purification systems at USAMRIID and resulting water collection."

Page 75 says that Fort Detrick has its own water treatment plant which uses "sand filtration."

Pages 77 - 78 are a summary of media recipes used at Ft. Detrick.

Page 80 contains this:

Drying anthrax can be done at home, but is very dangerous.


Drying the organism you can use dryers or lyopholizers.

Pages 82 - 85 are documents dated January 6, 2005 which related to variability in spore concentration in spore preparations.  Ivins pointed out differences between when he turned flask RMR-1029 over to the FBI and when he got it back.

Pages 88 - 111 are a Feb. 2, 2005 report on telephone calls between Ft. Detrick and places in New Jersey from April 1997 to December 1999.    


Doc. #847423 (a.k.a. "File 30 of 59")

Page 1 contains information on how many spores per week were created by Ivins.

          XXXXX used to grow XXXXXXX would have used IVINS' spore stock as [her] seed stock for each batch, and would have initially streaked it on a plate, and isolated one colony to grow the batch.  IVINS' spore stock was kept in a tube in the walk-in refrigerator and was not frozen.  XXXXXX would have gone back to the same stock to start each batch, rather than to plate from the previous batch.  Although [she] was not certain what the sample name was for the seed stock that [she] used, [she] knew that it would have been the same ass what IVINS used for his seed stock.  Specific batch information could be found in IVINS' laboratory notebooks.  Approximately 100 milliliters (mL) of spores were being produced per week at a concentration of 8.5 x 10 [to the 8th] or [ten to the 9th] and up to approximately 10 [to the 11th] spores per mL. 

Pages 3 - 12 are a September 8, 2004 FBI interview with Bruce Ivins where Ivins where he explains his "single colony technique" for creating spore cultures.  It describes that you do not need a large number of spores for "intramuscular (IM) challenges," but you do need a large number of spores for aerosol challenges. 

Page 4 seems to indicate that, in his lab, only Ivins and one or two other persons made spores from 1988 to 2004.  At the bottom of page 4 and into page 5 there is this:

In 1989, IVINS was working with XXXXX.  They were looking at the quality of spores grown in Leighton and Doi media versus the quality of spores grown in agar.  They found that spores grown in Leighton and Doi media were "hotter", cleaner, nicer, smaller, less likely to clump, and aersolize better.

On page 5 there's this:

Ivins noted that he is making nearly 1 trillion spores a week for USAMRIID, the National Institute of Allergies and Infectious Diseases (NIAID), the Centers for Disease Control (CDC), etc.

Plus there's information about toxins in spores created via the single colony pick method versus the sweep method.  And there's information about flask RMR-1030.

Page 6 explains very clearly that flask RMR-1030 was created BEFORE flask RMR-1029.  It also has a lot of detail about why Ivins created flask RMR-1029.

Page 7 has this:

          IVINS reviewed the Reference Material Receipt Record for RMR-1029.  He stated that this was not a legal document and was only meant to keep track of the inventory to know when more spores would be needed.  IVINS explained that since RMR-1029 were Good Laboratory Practices (GLP) spores, they were not accessible to many people.

Page 7 also has Ivins' descriptions of the various samples taken from RMR-1029.  It explains that he condensed one sample, and that's why he shipped a smaller volume of spore than was actually taken from flask RMR-1029.  And it says the samples removed on August 27, 2001 and October 4, 2001 were "undiluted" samples.  He explains how samples were taken to Building 1412 and restates that flask RMR-1029 was NEVER taken to 1412, only material from it was carried there.

Page 8 explains that water would evaporate from flask RMR-1029 because it didn't have an air-tight seal.  So, it was not unexpected to have the actual quantity of material be less than what the receipt record showed.  Plus, Ivins remembered a shipment to the University of New Mexico in 2001 that wasn't recorded on the log, although he couldn't remember why it wasn't recorded.

Page 9 contains Ivins' descriptions of some differences between the way spores were made at Ft. Detrick in 2001 versus today (2004).

Page 11, at the bottom, begins a discussion of "heat shocking" to get bacteria to sporulate.

Page 12 mentions Ivins doing a search through is archived emails for the term "Ames" and finding 1,200 emails.

The rest of the .pdf file is interviews with various people.


Doc. #847425 (a.k.a. "File 04 of 59")

Pages 1-2 are a January 12, 2007 telephone interview with someone discussing the subject of fermentors at Ft. Detrick and Ivins' use of them.  Pages 3-4 are more of the same with someone else.

Page 6-9 are about suggestions that dry spores be used for testing at Ft. Detrick.

Page 8 contains this criticism of Bruce Ivins' methods:

          XXXXX has no knowledge of any Ba fermentation being performed, but believes the current spore production procedure and acquisition of wet spore preparations is perceived as an issue.  XXXXX elaborated by saying that spore preparations provided by BRUCE IVINS lack overall consistency in preparation parameters between batches.  This consistency diminished along with the Dugway produced spores (writer believes these Dugway spores to be RMR-1029).  XXXXX believes that IVINS grows batches of spores in order to meet the quantitative demand, with little parameter consistency between batches.

Pages 10 - 12 contain a January 12, 2007 interview with someone at Ft. Detrick who believes that Ivins had the ability to produce the spores used in the attacks.

Pages 13 - 14 contain a January 23, 2007 interview with someone else at Ft. Detrick who believes that Ivins had the ability to produce the spores used in the attacks.

 Pages 15 - 19 contain a January 30, 2007 interview with someone who discusses the need to use dry spores to accurately test vaccines.

Page 17 has this:

          Ba spores used by the Aerobiology group were always provided by BRUCE IVINS, who was known as the "star spore grower."

Page 23 contains this:

[Linscott] perceived the normal laboratory hours to start between the morning hours of 7:00AM to 9:00AM and last through 5:00PM, although there would be occasions when someone would come in later. If someone came in on the weekend it was to look at the animals/count the dead animals. This could take approximately two hours and was usually a one-person job.

Page 24 says that Ivins liked to take showers at Ft. Detrick on days when he wasn't working, and he went into Ft. Detrick to get away from home, to use the Internet, etc.

Page 34 says that Building 1412 was not compartmentalized like Building 1425, which meant that the entire building 1412 was considered "hot."

Page 36 contains another person saying that Bruce Ivins could have made the attack anthrax.

Page 41 contains this:

According to XXXXX, prolonged off-hour access to suites (over two hours in the middle of the night), especially a Bio-Safety Level-3 (BSL-3) suite is abnormal, as well as a safety violation.  Because fatigue could lead to accidents, entering into a BSL-3 environment alone for extended periods of time in the middle of the night was a significant safety issue.


Doc. #847426 (a.k.a. "File 06 of 59")

Two documents: A report on a September 8, 2004 meeting at USAMRIID where the FBI discussed the things they needed, and an August 24, 2004 letter from the FBI to the head of Ft. Detrick listing things they need for a list of people - including Bruce Ivins and two deceased people: Frederick Knauert and Oliver Mikesell.


Doc. #847443 (a.k.a. "File 29 of 59")

Page 1 is a memo dated 02/01/2007 where the FBI opens "sub-files" on Bruce Edwards Ivins and the surveillance of Bruce Edwards Ivins.

Page 2 is a one page report on an interview with Dr. Ivins on November 19, 2001.  Ivins merely says that he has knowledge of anthrax.  The interview appears to be to get Ivins' opinion about Joseph Farchaus.

Pages 3 -  describe how Ivins contacted the FBI on January 23, 2002, to give them two photographs of Bacillus anthracis growing on agar plates.  He talks about how mutations appear if the growth is allowed to continue for over 24 hours or so.

Page 4 contains comments where Ivins tries to point the finger at others who work at Ft. Detrick.

Ivins knows of two people who have the knowledge and character required to have prepared and sent the anthrax letters.  He does not have any evidence that either of them actually did send the anthrax letters.

No one is supposed to remove any hot material from the USAMRIID facility.  It would be possible to take material out without detection, and IVINS does not know if XXXXX took any Bacillus anthracis with XXXXX.

Also from page 4, presumably a summary of comments from Bruce Ivins:

the spores in the DASCHLE letter were of fermentation quality.  The spores were very clean compared to Bacillus anthracis produced on agar which would contain messy residue.

At the bottom of page 4 and into page 5:

          If someone who had received the original USAMRIID AMES stock did the same kind of passages/transfers that XXXXX did, it is extremely unlikely that they would produce the same mutations to reflect the same morphological differences as the XXXXX stock.  Mutations are random, and the likelihood of getting the same mutations are not great.  There should be records in the various labs to show the number of passages used in any research conducted with the AMES strain.  XXXXX did not use pure culture technique, and the original stock in IVINS possession is "just a slant away from the cow" to his knowledge.

           XXXXX use XXXXX stock of AMES in their research.  IVINS XXXXX use the original USAMRIID AMES stock.

          DNA sequencing should show the differences in genetics which cause the morphological differences between the two stocks of AMES.  XXXXX work on genotyping only looks at 1% or less of the total genome.  The mutations causing morphological differences would not show up in XXXXX work.

Pages 7 - 14 describe a January 29, 2002 FBI interview with Dr. Bruce Ivins.   Ivins began working with anthrax in 1980-81 after the Sverdlovsk incident.

Page 8 contains this:

          The method of propagation of the Ames strain of B. anthracis differed between XXXXX and Bruce Ivins.  Ivins used single colony dilutions to propagate the Ames culture.  XXXXX used mass wipes of culture to propagate his collection.  As a result, mutations became evident in XXXXX collection of the strain that were not present in Ivins' strain collection.  Ivins has documentation and records to back up all shipments of the Ames strain which he has sent out.

On page 12 Ivins again points the finger at others.  Page 12 also has the comment where Dr. Ivins claimed that he didn't know how to make powders (which the DOJ/FBI refers to on page 38 of the Amerithrax Summary):

Ivins said that he had no involvement in the anthrax mailings and has had no training in making powders.

On page 14 there's this:

          Ivins noted that the ratio of spores to media for B. anthacis in a liquid preparation is approximately 10(8) spores per milliliter.  Therefore, it would take 20 liters of media to make two grams of spores.

Page 15 describes an FBI interview with Dr. Ivins on Feb. 26, 2002.

Pages 16 - 19 describe FBI interviews with Dr. Ivins on Apr. 24 & 25, 2002.  These interviews describe the lab cleanings Ivins performed in December of 2001 and April 2002.  

Page 19 contains this:

          On the morning of 04/19/02, there was a "town hall meeting" where the [cleaning and swabbing] incidents were discussed.  They were notified that a large scale sampling survey would be conducted to determine the extent of the contamination.

          When asked why he was able to find B.A., when the other swabbing efforts did not, IVINS explained that he utilizes a more aggressive and extensive method for collecting samples.  He samples a larger area, especially hard to reach and dusty areas, and uses more force.  He also explained that prior to the large scale swabbing survey by the Center for Health Promotion and Preventative Medicine (CHPPM), he, XXXXX took samples outside the B3 lab and subsequently cleaned the area thoroughly with bleach.

Pages 20-21 are about a phone call Dr. Ivins made to the FBI on April 30, 2002.  Ivins describes how he swabbed areas at Ft. Detrick but his results were put into an autoclave by someone else before the results could be examined.

Pages 22 - 27 describe a February 12, 2003 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.  Page 22 contains this:

          IVINS advised that there was a safety problem with the handling of the anthrax letters at USAMRIID that put people's health at risk.  Two people at USAMRIID had something to gain by the letters being analyzed at the lab,  and the situation was just a nightmare for everyone else involved.  As such, these two individuals had the most to lose from any problems uncovered with handling of the letters.  IVINS identified these two individuals as XXXXX.

Page 23 contains this: 

          IVINS did not handle the Leahy, Post, or Brokaw letters.  He worked with the powder from the Leahy and Post letters and did not work with any of the material from the Brokaw letter.

          IVINS advised that latex gloves were used by people working in B3.  The gloves were not of the greatest quality as they were bargain gloves and sometimes had holes or were torn.  IVINS did  not wear gloves when touching any commonly handled items in B3.

Page 24 contains this:

          IVINS did the following calculation estimates to determine how much of the Dugway spores [RMR-1029 spores] would have been missing if they had been used in the anthrax mailings.  2.0-2.5 grams of material were present in each letter with a 10(8)/mL spore concentration.  In order to achieve that spore concentration, 10-100L of runs would have been necessary and approximately 300mL of the Dugway material would have been required.  This amount of missing material would have been noticed.

          Double purified material needs to have a chromatogram done to determine whether it was run through a gradient.  A trace of the gradient would remain on the material and should be indicated by a peak on the chromatogram.  Some possible gradients include sucrose, hypague, renografin (which became known as renocal but may not be manufactured any longer), or phycoll.

          IVINS thinks that most of the people at USAMRIID use broth to grow B.a., although he can't say for certain how everyone else grows their spores.  Although B.a. can be grown on agar, nicer spores are produced in broth, and they can be purified more easily and are "hotter."  If one needs to purify more than a very small amount of B.a., it is difficult to use agar as you would need numerous plates.

          Spores grown up on agar are dirtier than broth grown.  IVINS does not know if this is because the spores pick up debris from the agar or if there are media components on the surface of the spore.  No matter how agar grown spores are washed, some agar always remains on the spores.

Page 25 contains this:

          The spores from the three letters that IVINS saw looked very different from each other.  He described the spores from the Daschle letter as looking very, very clean; the spores from the Leahy letter as looking good, with a bit of clumping.  IVINS asked XXXXX of the FBI if the Daschle letter could represent "downstream processing" in that the spores either went from bad to good or good to bad.


IVINS did not have any email records or electronic calendar records prior to May 2002.  He thought that there may have been a new system installed around that time.

Page 26 contains this:

             IVINS took agents on a walk through of the areas of Building 1425 where he handled the anthrax letters.  He received the Daschle letter contained in two or three ziplock bags from XXXXX.  He took the letter through the B3 passbox into Room XXX  IVINS' lab space in B3.  XXX can be seen through the window to the left of the B3 passbox as well as through the B3 crash door.  He brought the vial containing B.a. from the Daschle letter out though the B3 passbox and to the scale in XXXXX a BL2 lab.  IVINS thinks that the vial he used is still in the refrigerator in XXX.

Page 27 contains this:

          IVINS was in B3 when the B.a. from the letter went all over the place in the hood.  He does not know how the hood was decontaminated, and he does not recall decontaminating it himself and advised that he would probably remember if he had done it.  He does not remember if XXXXX decontaminated the hood.  IVINS did not routinely record such things during that time frame.

          IVINS was recently at Home Depot and saw the many different grades of sandpaper that they sell which made him think about the use of sand in purifying B.a.     A pasty block of spores can be shaken with sand of varying coarseness to achieve very pure or fine spores.  IVINS advised that Iraq has very fine sand.

Page 28 is an entirely redacted list of people Ivins thought the FBI should speak with.

Page 29 is Ivins' report on his analysis of the Daschle spores on 17 October 2001.

Page 30 is Ivins 24 October 2001 report on his analysis of (presumably) the Leahy spores, but it could be the Post material.

Page 31 is Ivins 12 March 2002 report on spores that appear to be about 99% refractile.

Pages 32-34 are Ivins' "Hoover Statement" about the cleaning of the labs that he performed.

Page 35 contains an FBI telephone interview with Ivins and lists of materials Ivins supplied  to the FBI.  It also has this:

He had also assembled some documents with information about the Dugway spore inventory and what he was working on in the fall of 2001, which was mostly "desk work."

Page 36 contains a statement of things Ivins handed over to the FBI, and the list of things Ivins was working on in the fall of 2001 is on page 37.

Page 40 - 42 contain a March 3, 2003 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.   

Page 40 has this:

          XXXXX contacted IVINS and asked him to get a hold of the Daschle letter and determine the spore concentration.  IVINS does not recall whether XXXXX told him to ask XXXXX for access to the Daschle letter or if XXXXX called the XXXXX and requested that IVINS be given access.  XXXXX may recall how XXXXX advised IVINS to obtain the Daschle letter.  XXXXX may remember whether it was XXXXX who called and asked XXXXX to give the Daschle letter to IVINS to process.

          IVINS did not initially know that XXXXX had custody of the Daschle letter.  He advised that even if XXXXX had told him to "go get the letter," IVINS would not have known to go to XXXXX to obtain it.  IVINS further advised that even if he had known that XXXXX was in custody of the letter and he had requested access to it without some kind of authorization, she probably would not have given it to him.

          XXXXX did not specify that IVINS should to the concentration determination in Suite B3.  IVINS XXXXX picked up the Daschle letter from XXXXX and took the Daschle letter to IVINS' lab space in B3 to do what XXXXX had requested.  In retrospect, IVINS thinks that they should have processed the Daschle letter in a glovebox rather than a hood, however there was not a glovebox in B3.

Page 41 contains information about the fact that they should not have taken the Daschle letter to B3 and a rule was set down that no further handing of evidence would take place in B3 or the Bacteriology Division in general.

The last paragraph on page 41 is as follows:

          What XXXXX told IVINS about XXXXX prompted him to conduct his independent swabbing project.  XXXXX said that the way the letters were being handled was terrible.  IVINS advised that the hot spots found in B3 during the swabbing may have been contamination from the Daschle letter.

Pages 43-44 are a report on a April 15, 2003 telephone interview with Dr. Ivins.  At the bottom of page 43 there's information about the location of the lyophilizers.

Page 44 has a description of how spores are taken from building 1425 to building 1412:

          For aerosol challenges, the stocks of Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) are kept in Suite B3.  Dilutions are made and kept in large glass bottles.  These bottles are placed in bags and then a transport can.  They are transported to the Building 1412 airlock and placed in the refrigerator one to three days prior to the spray.  The pre-challenge inoculum incubates overnight in Room XXX.

Page 45 is a April 17, 2003 telephone FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.  It contains this:

          IVINS feels badly because his work could have played a role in the anthrax mailings.  Someone could have read his research and determined that Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) Ames was vaccine resistant.

          After his telephonic conversation with SA XXXXX on 04/15/2003, IVINS feels sick over the fact that the material used in the anthrax mailings could have come from a stock made from the B.a. aerosol challenge trash.

Page 46 contains a description of a day when an FBI agent accompanied Dr. Ivins into B3 and an agar slant and a shipping container from Texas A&M postmarked February 18, 1981.  It is identified as "AMES 255414B B. Anthracis."  (This is the original material from Texas A&M long after it was learned that it didn't come from Iowa.)

Pages 48- are another FBI interview with Dr. Ivins, this one on August 13, 2003.  More samples of Ames are turned over, including "1030 reference material."  There's more information about the source of RMR-1030.

PERRY MIKESELL is mentioned on page 49.  It says he died in 2002.

Page 49 contains more explanation of why Ivins uses the single colony pick.

Page 50 is another interview with Dr. Ivins on September 5, 2003.

Page 51 is another telephone interview with Dr. Ivins on September 3, 2003.  It says:

IVINS stores his Bacillus anthracis (BA) strains and seed stocks in a freezer located in Building 1425 at USAMRIID.  IVINS' freezer belongs to the Bacteriology Division at USMRIID and is located in a Bio-Safety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory in 1425.  XXXXX and IVINS share the same BSL-3 laboratory, but XXXXX uses a different freezer than IVINS.

Page 52 discusses the sending of 8 slants to FBIR on October 21, 2003.

Pages 54-61  are a December 12, 2003 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.  They contain details of the samples Ivins sent to FBIR in April 2002 and Ivins' descriptions: 

1) "Original slant Ames spores - 1981"- This is the original sample sent from Texas, which was Ba Ames strain isolated from a cow.

2) "7800a - primary subculture from original slant- 1985- Bruce Ivins"- This is a subculture that IVINS made in 1985 from the original 1981 slant.

3) "7800b - XXXXX Ames strain from 1985 - Multiple Passages"- This is from XXXX's collection.  IVINS is unsure how this sample was made.

4) "7737 - Dugway Ames spores- 1997"- This is Ba Ames spores sent from DUGWAY PROVING GROUNDS for use in aerosol challenges.  This material was used as the reference lot.  Originally XXXX purified spores were sent.  The spores stored in two 500 mL flasks.  IVINS has approximately 100 mL left of this sample.

Page 56 contains a detailed description of how RMR-1030 was made.

On page 57 it says that B3 and B4 are connected, so anyone who has access to B3 also has access to B4.

Page 58 talks of friction between scientists because of their education levels - Masters versus Doctorate.

Page 59 seems to contain a suggestion by Ivins that Israel may have somehow obtained a sample of Ames.

Page 70 is a description of how flask RMR-1030 was turned over to the FBI on January 19, 2004.  The contents were irradiated and then tested on January 30 to make sure no spores were viable.  On February 2, 2004 Ivins reports that the tests are negative for viable spores.

Pages 71 - 72 are a March 18, 2004 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.  On page 71 is this:

          IVINS consulted with XXXXX at USAMRIID Computer Services and learned that electronic mail (email) can be retrieved for a two year period, however it is expensive to do so.  If more than two years have passed, it is not possible to retrieve email.

Page 72 has this:

          IVINS provided the following information relative to his whereabouts during September 17-18, 2001 and October 5-9, 2001:

          five hard copies of emails sent and received by IVINS on September 17 and 19, 2001 and October 5, 2001;

          copies of music lists for the church where he performed XXXXX on September 16, 2001 and October 7, 2001:

          a hard copy of an email from XXXXX detailing some of IVINS' Red Cross activities during the fall of 2001, none of which fell within the two time frames in question;

          a list of IVINS' bank and credit card account numbers and information.

Pages 73 - 79 describe the April 7, 2004 collecting of more samples of the Ames strain from USAMRIID freezers and storage areas for the FBI repository (FBIR).

Pages 80 - 81 describe an April 13, 2004 FBI telephone interview with Dr. Ivins.  

Page 81 has this:

          IVINS emphasized that he had no reason to suspect that anyone he worked with in Bacteriology was responsible for mailing the anthrax letters.  He was very concerned about the possibility of the Dugway Ba being involved in the anthrax mailings.  Building 1412 is a "black hole" for Ba, and IVINS and his coworkers believed that the Dugway spores were safe in the B3 and B4 suites.  Consequently, they saw no need to guard their trash.

Page 82 is the report of a phone call to the FBI from Dr. Ivins where he corrects some information about the water used in spore preparations.

Pages 83 - 87 are a description of a May 7, 2004 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.

Page 84 has this:

          IVINS has never had to add antifoam or any other chemical to his production method for producing Ames spores.  The shaking of the shaker flasks in the broth production is not enough to create a need for antifoam or any similar product.  He is not aware of any protocol used at USAMRIID which calls for the use of antifoam with Ames.  The protocol for aerosol challenges does not call for antifoam.

Page 85 contains a lot of information about how samples from RMR-1029 are handled.

Page 86 contains this:

Before September 11, 2001, researchers at USAMRIID did not scrutinize their coworkers.  They did not wonder if someone present in a hot suite was there for the wrong reason.

Pages 91 - 92 contain a June 29, 2004 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins about notebooks.  

Page 94 is a report on an August 4, 2004 call from Dr. Ivins where he tells the FBI about a report where adding silica to spores was once discussed.  The report says:

          On August 4, 2004, BRUCE IVINS of the United States Army

Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), Fort

Detrick, Maryland, telephonically contacted Supervisory Special

Agent (SSA) XXXXXXXXXXXXXX of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

(FBI).  IVINS reported that XXXXXXXXXXXXX also of USAMRIID, had

provided him with a scientific article abstract about Bacillus

spore suspensions in which the addition of silica to the spore coat

was discussed.  IVINS offered to send the article abstract via

facsimile to SSA XXXXXXX and subsequently sent the abstract to the

FBI offsite in Frederick, Maryland.  The cover sheet and article

abstract are maintained in the 1A section of the file.

Page 95 is a report about an August 21, 2004 call from Dr. Ivins where Ivins informs them that the Los Angeles Times has a story about swabbing done at Ft. Detrick in 2002.  It was upsetting to Ivins that such information was made public.

Page 97 is a diagram that Dr. Ivins prepared which shows all the places that the original Ames slant from 1981 got distributed.

Page 98 is report on a September 13, 2004 telephone call to the FBI where Ivins explains that flask RMR-1029 was never taken to building 1412, they only took aliquots to 1412.

Page 99 is a report on a September 20, 2004 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.  It says:

          IVINS' laboratory group has been producing one trillion Bacillus anthracis (B.a.) Ames spores per week using the Leighton and Doi protocol.  They have not used fermentation in the production of these spores.


          Vegetative cells are not usually stored because they can be grown at any time, however when they are stored, they are frozen with a cryopreservative such as glycerol.  Vegetative cells are shipped in the same manner.

Page 100 is a July 30, 2004 report on an investigation that contains this:

          Upon review of BRUCE IVINS' home telephone records and credit card purchases for 2001, it was noted that The College Board in Ewing, New Jersey (NJ) was called from his home telephone, and that IVINS also had a credit card charge to The College Board for October SAT registration.

Page 101 is a report where it is learned that Ivins took a course on lyophilization.

Pages 102 - 104 are a report on a December 3, 2004 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.  Ivins works with Bioport on testing a vaccine, and argues with Bioport about what is acceptable for a vaccine.  50% survival rate is okay for Bioport, but not for Ivins.

Page 103 contains this:

          IVINS described the doctors at Bioport as incompetent.  He described the other individuals working at Bioport as "people with very poor laboratory practices."  "Individuals with no science background, and essentially assembly line technicians hired to put out a product."

Page 105 describes a January 13, 2005 search of Ivins' office at Ft. Detrick.

Page 106 - 110 describes a January 13, 2005 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.    

Page 107 contains a suggestion that RMR-1029 was created using spores from RMR-1030, but then that idea is shot down.

Page 107 at the bottom and into page 108 contains this:

          IVINS' record of the dissemination of Reference Material Receipt (RMR) 1029, the Ames spores which were a combination of Dugway-produced spores and spores made by IVINS, was kept only for the purpose of allowing the researchers to estimate how much of the material was left so they would not run out of spores for aerosol challenges.  The record was not kept as any kind of precise inventory for security reasons.  The amounts of remaining material were only estimates and were not accurately measured for each entry.

Page 108 contains this:

          IVINS mentioned the recent issue discussed with SA XXXXX regarding the concentration of RMR-1029 when it was returned to IVINS from the FBI.  IVINS had gone back through his documentation after talking with SA XXXXX and had listed the concentrations of RMR-1029 at various points in time since its creation.  The concentration over time ranged from 3.1 - 5.2 x10(10) spores per ml.  When the same was returned to IVINS from the FBI, he found the concentration to be 2.4 x 10(10) spores per ml.

          For the concentrations determined by IVINS, he swirled the flask of RMR 1029 to mix the spore preparation, removed a subsample and prepared dilutions, the plated the 10-8 dilution.  He then counted the colonies which grew from the dilution.

          The decreased spore concentration of RMR 1029 after its return to IVINS was not a major problem.  They readjusted the sample by adding more spores to it so there was enough Ames material for XXXXX vaccine challenge.

Page 118 is a report on a February 2, 2005 voice mail message that Ivins left on an FBI agents phone regarding flask RMR-1039 and also regarding the dilution of the contents of flask RMR-1029. 

Pages 120 - 121 contain a report on a February 17, 2005 FBI interview with Dr. Ivins.  It seems to be mainly about testing done with people from the University of Michigan. 

Page 121 contains this:

          IVINS advised he was not impressed with their scientific techniques.  IVINS further advised XXXXX were "at each others throats."  IVINS advised XXXXX was "a jerk" and had problems with everyone to include XXXXX.

          IVINS advised he referred to XXXXX as XXXXX because IVINS observed a thick patch of hair on the small of XXXXX back while they were "showering out."


Doc. #847444 (a.k.a. "File 22 of 59")

Pages 1 - 23 are a report on an interview of Dr. Ivins which took place on March 31, 2005. 

Page 2 contains this:

          By way of background, Ivins related that in October 2001, the Daschle letter was initially weighed in Room XXXXX and then processed and photographed in Rooms XXXXX.  These rooms are part of the Special Pathogens Branch of DSD and are biosafety level two (BLS-2) facilities.  All three rooms are located in building 1425.  Following the initial processing of the Daschle letter, IVINS was tasked by XXXXX to assess the concentration of the anthrax powder in the Daschle envelope.  To perform a colony count, IVINS took the Daschle letter to Room XXXXX in Suite B3.

Page 4 contains this:

          IVINS advised that December 2001 and April 2002 environmental samplings represent the only two times he has ever swabbed in the cold areas of USAMRIID outside of the hot suites.  IVINS related that during the early 1990s he performed a lot of swabbing inside the hot suites as part of USAMRIID's routine environmental monitoring program.  He conducted this sampling at the direction of his superiors.  These samples were collected as a routine safety precaution and, unlike his December 2001 and April 2002 collections, were not performed in response to a specific concern or suspected contamination.  IVINS has since been excluded from the task of any such monitoring.

          IVINS reported that no isolates related to his December 2001 or April 2002 swabbing initiatives remain in existence.  IVINS said he threw them away after obtaining the presumptive positive results.

Page 6 contains this:

          ADMINSTRATIVE: On January 13, 2005, the hard drive of IVINS' assigned USAMRIID computer was copied by the FBI with his consent.  A review of the hard drive copy revealed that e-mails for the year 2001 appeared to be missing from the hard drive, although e-mail activities for the prior and subsequent years were located.  IVINS was asked by interviewing agents to explain the reason for this omission.

          IVINS advised that he was very surprised by the interviewing Agents' claim that his 2001 e-mails were missing from his hard drive.  IVINS said he archives e-mails by subject, not by date, however, he believes e-mail for this time period should be on his computer.  As he had mentioned in a previous interview, IVINS stated that he is not sure whether his e-mail archives to his hard drive or to USAMRIID's server.  IVINS said that if his 2001 e-mails are on the USAMRIID's server rather than his hard drive, he would allow the FBI to make a copy of them.  IVINS insisted that he did not delete any batches of e-mail from his computer pertaining to the year 2001.  He agreed to allow SA XXXXX and an FBI Computer Analysis Response Team (CART) agent copy any e-mails he had archived on the server.  This operation, documented separately, was arranged at the end of this interview and took place the same day, shortly after the interview.

Page 7 contains this:

          IVINS elaborated on a comment made in a prior interview that the Daschle anthrax powder appeared to him to have been fermenter-grown.  IVINS based this judgment on his observation that broth-grown spores (fermentation method) are always cleaner than agar-grown spores.  IVINS noted that when he saw the anthrax powder from the Daschle envelope, he immediately thought to himself, "fermenter-grown."

Ivins then proceeds to point the finger at others at Ft. Detrick.

Page 8 contains this:

          IVINS submitted to the FBI certain isolates of Ames strain Bacillus anthracis which were in his possession and under his control.  However, he did not submit all Ames strain isolates in his possession.  Some of the samples he omitted from his XXXXX response were subsequently recovered by the FBI during a consent search of freezers in IVINS' lab.  Some of these omitted samples exhibit the same genetic attributes as the anthrax used in the attacks.  The interviewing Agents questioned IVINS concerning these omissions.

As usual, Ivins' response is pure obfuscation - claims that he interpreted the request to mean something that it didn't mean.

Page 9 contains interesting stuff about flask RMR-1029 and Ivins' control of it.

Page 10 contains statements that flask RMR-1029 was NEVER stored in building 1412, but was ALWAYS stored in building 1425. 

Page 11 contains Ivins' explanation of the 100 ml error on his log for flask RMR-1029.

Page 12 contains Ivins' explanation of the creation of the spores in flask RMR-1029.  It says that Dugway used fermentors to make their spores.

IVINS said this mixing together of disparate combinations of Ames spore preparations was of no scientific concern because consistency between individual batches was not important - the objective was to amass one lot of 1,000 milliliters of Ames spores as quickly as possible.

Page 13 repeats information about how Ivins purified spores "using the RenoCal®/Renografin® purification process."

Page 14 contains information about a discrepancy in the concentration data for flask RMR-1029.  The Navy lab says it was 10 percent less concentrated than Ivins claimed.

Page 15 contains this:

IVINS estimated that on average somewhere between every fifth and every tenth batch of spores had to be discarded due to inadequate quality.

Page 16 explains why Phenol is added to the spore concentrations.  The page also starts a discussion of who benefited from the anthrax attacks at USAMRIID and elsewhere.

Page 17 says that Ivins received a royalty check for $6,000 for his invention of "Congo Red Mutant" a version of anthrax that does not form spores.

Pages 24 - 27 contain another interview with Dr. Ivins on March 31, 2005.  This time it takes place at his home as the FBI makes a copy of the hard drive on his personal computer.

Page 24 contains more about flask RMR-1029 and whether or not it was ever stored in building 1412. 

Page 25 has another mention of "Perry Mikesell" whose name is spelled out and not redacted as with every other name except Dr. Ivins'.   Also on page 25:

In IVINS' experience, freezing "wrecks" spores.  He has never seen lyophilized spores which were not damaged or in poor condition.  For this reason, IVINS does not believe the material in the anthrax-laced letters was lyophilized.  If it was lyophilized, something was probably added to protect the spores.

Page 27 says that on April 4, 2005, Dr. Ivins advised the FBI agents that he had hired a lawyer and that his lawyer should be present for all further interviews.

Page 30 explains a process of testing the spores in RMR-1029.  Ivins and an FBI agent prepare 9 Tryptic Soy Agar (TSA) plates each by inoculating the plates.

At the bottom of page 30, Ivins and the FBI agent return to look at the result of their tests.

Page 33 begins another meeting between the FBI and Dr. Ivins to get something from Ivins lab for transportation to the Navy Medical Research Center (NMRC).

Page 35 begin a description of testing ath the NMRC where it appears the same kind of testing that was done with Ivins is repeated, but this time with Sheep's Blood Agar (SBA) plates.

Page 37 - 39 describe another interview with Dr. Ivins at Ft. Detrick.  This one occurred on January 30, 2007.      

Page 40 describes the FBI looking at a couple boxes Dr. Ivins had sent to him via the mails.  The FBI examines the outside of the two boxes while they are still at the post office in Frederick, Maryland.

Page 44 is a Grand Jury subpoena dated February 9, 2007, calling for documents to be made available on February 22, 2007 at 10 a.m..  It says on the subpoena that disclosure of the existence of the subpoena could be against the law. 

Page 46 is a letter from the DOJ which mentions the subpoena and how discussing it with the wrong people could be against the law.   

Pages 48 - 54 contain another interview with Dr. Ivins, this one on February 27, 2007.   It takes place at the office of Dr. Ivins' attorney.

Page 48 seems to describe some kind of fight or encounter at Ft. Detrick.  Ivins evidently wasn't involved.

Pages 55 - 61 describe an interview with an unnamed person who appears to be Dr. Ivins' assistant or a co-worker - probably female.  On page 55 it says:

At USAMRIID there were two main laboratories that worked with the Ames strain.  One worked from the original stock, while the other went from plate to plate to plate.  BRUCE IVINS has the main stock from 1981.  XXXXX would use a single colony pick to inoculate flasks when preparing spores.

At the bottom of page 55 and continuing on to page 57 there's a description of how there didn't appear to be any mutations after 24 hours, but after 48 hours thing would appear. 

This person evidently helped Ivins with his testing of the samples taken during one of the times he did unauthorized cleanings and on page 57 she says it was curious that the contamination was in the men's change room but not in the women's change room.

On page 58 it describes Ivins handling the Daschle letter wearing only a glove as protection.

Page 61 contains an interesting fact:  "SBA leaves a blood residue on the spores, and liquid spores are easier to clean."

Page 61 also contains information about labeling the samples sent to FBIR in February and April of 2002.

Page 65 contains a description of a bunch of cans found in a cardboard box in the Cold Room of XXXXX.

Page 67 is an April 11, 2007 "Request periodic surveillance" letter regarding Bruce Ivins:

"Bruce Edwards Ivins is an extremely sensitive suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks."

Page 96 is a robbery report describing an incident where Bruce Ivins was the victim of an attempted robbery on 10/08/2000.  Police reports are on the pages that follow.

Page 132 contains a creepy revelation where, in 1983 or 4 Ivins called the KKG sorority at the University of Tennessee and offered to play the guitar and sing some songs for them.  When they allowed him to do so, he sang KKG ritual songs, which were supposed to be secret.  The police were called and he was removed from the premises.

A lot of creepy stuff about Ivins and the KKG sorority is on the pages that follow.

Page 157 has information from a Confidential Human Resource (CHS) about Ivins' father and mother:

          Although IVINS's father was a pharmacists, IVINS always wanted to be a scientist, even a microbiologist, from an early age.  IVINS's father was at times physically "abused" by his wife; IVINS's mom stabbed his father with a fork on one occasion and "split his [the father's] head with a broom stick on XXXXX.  IVINS indicated his mother was very controlling.  XXXXX the past IVINS's has remarked XXXXXXXX of his subservient role in his marriage.  XXXXXXXXXXXXXX

          IVINS confided XXXXX he did not have a good relationship with his father, and his father "did not care for anyone [his wife, IVINS, or his brothers].  For this reason, IVINS had a hard time dealing with providing care for his father in his elder years.  IVINS expressed anger and resentment in having to care for his aging father.


          IVINS viewed himself as a "nerd," a "science geek," and not a ladies man.  During this same period of lamenting, IVINS further confided, "I'm not attractive."

          It is unknown to CHS why IVINS has such an affinity for sorority matters.  XXXX XXXX XXXX IVINS confided XXXXX he (IVINS) has never cheated on his wife, and considers such actions as morally wrong.

Page 171 describes a September 6, 2007 interview with a psychiatrist who treated Dr. Ivins at some point in time.  There's only one psychiatrist at the facility, and there is mention of a wife also working there.  The interview goes into details about how the group therapy sessions worked.

The practice no longer provides group therapy sessions due to lack of interest on the part of their patients.  Attendance at the sessions had gone down to 2-3 persons per week.  The last group session was approximately 2-3 months ago.

Page 172 contains this:

          XXXXX acknowledged that if a patient admitted to or threatened to commit a crime that XXXXX had a duty to report it to the authorities.  XXXXX was asked if any of XXXXX patients had threatened to or actually send threatening or harassing communications.  XXXXX recalled that two of XXXXX patients had and added that authorities had already been involved when the patients professed to their activities.

           XXXXX was curious to learn the nature of this investigation and the identity of the patient that was the subject of the interview.  However, XXXXX advised that XXXXX ethically could not keep a secret from a patient.  Therefore, the nature of this investigation and the subject of this inquiry were not revealed to XXXXX.  XXXXX agreed to provide the requested information and to be available for further interviews.


Doc. #847447 (a.k.a. "File 13 of 59")

Page 6 has this:

Recently an inventory was conducted of the same and it was noted that there was items on IVINS's shelf that indicated there were spores of the Ames strain of Bacillus anthracis contained therein.  When queried, Ivins responded that he had irradiated those spores.  When queried as to where the appropriate paperwork was which documented the irradiation, IVINS responded something to the effect, "was I supposed to do that?"  CHS [Confidential Human Resource] thought his behavior was peculiar as if IVINS thought of himself as being scrutinized pertaining to the anthrax-laced letter mailings, then why would he not attempt to do things by the books?

Pages 9 - 13 are a report on an interview with someone from the KKG sorority who was aware of Ivins trying to buy KKG items on the Internet using the name JimmyFlatHead.  Ivins also maliciously maintained the Wikipedia entry for KKG. 

Other interviews with other people from KKG follow the above interview.

Page 50 begins another interview with Bruce Ivins, this one dated Sept. 15, 2007, and on that page he explains why he had a black eye.  The interview ends on page 52.

Page 53 - 55 are requests - apparently to Dr. Ivins' psychiatrist - for records of when Ivins attended group therapy sessions on and between August 6, 2001, and October 29, 2001.  They seem to involve several attempts to get the records in mid-October 2007.

Page 56 is a statement from Psychiatry Center of Frederick dated October 13, 2007, saying the records are not available.  They were thrown out or destroyed.

Page 61 is a report dated October 18, 2007, where someone says that Ivins told a grand jury that XXXXX was behind the anthrax attacks.  Ivins was apparently talking about a former USAMRIID employee who once lived within a mile of Ottilie Lundgren, the elderly anthrax victim in Connecticut.

Pages 68 - 70 is a description of a search done of Dr. Ivins' safe deposit box on November 2, 2007.  It's interesting that they left a copy of the search warrant inside the box.

Pages 88 - 92 contain a list of items in "box 1" of items found at Dr. Ivins' home in the search which took place on November 1-2, 2007.  

Item 11 is a passport application indicating that Ivins planned to travel to Russia on July 13, 2001.

Item 12 is equipment to detect if your home or phone are being bugged.

Item 21 is "A bag with fake hair pieces such as sideburns, and a mustache; glue, puddy wax, bruise kit, fake blood, makeup, powder and a brush."

Item 25 includes a piece of paper with information about Bacillus subtilis.

Item 31 includes photocopies of notebooks from USAMRIID.

Page 96 includes a November 14, 2007 review of the items seized during the search of Dr. Ivins offices and work place on November 1 or 2.   The page also includes a lot of information about flask RMR-1029.

Pages 97 - 108 are "Spore Preparation forms" by Dr. Ivins describing uses made of the spores in flask RMR-1029.  They are dated April 2000 - July 2001, then there's more from 1997 and 1999.

Page 109 is a form dated October 22, 1997 describing the contents of some "screw-capped polypropylene tubes" (USAMRIID Part No. 1029) and says that the spores came from "Ames, Iowa."  It says they were stored in building 1412.

Page 110 is another form dated October 22, 1997 where most of the information from the previous form has been copied over, with some differences; (1) the location is now building 1425, (2) the material is in "polycarbonate flasks" and (3) the list of amounts used from the flasks continues after 4/3/00.

Page 115 is a letter from Ivins to Senator Barbara Mikulski protesting any legislation that would allow child molesters to get employment in jobs involving children.   Page 116 is a similar letter to a different Senator.

Page 117 is a November 15, 2007 summary of items found in a briefcase.  Included in the list of items in the briefcase are:

Copy of the Washington Post article from July 18, 2000 "Anthrax Shots' Effect Challenged" which is critical of the vaccine. [Copy on page 119.]

Copy of the 'original' RMR-1029 inventory sheet listing room 115, building 1412 as the storage location.  [Copy on page 120.]

Copy of a letter from XXXXX to BRUCE IVINS postmarked April 11, 2006 in Trenton NJ with a text of "Hello Bruce, A gift from Princeton.  Enjoy the postmark. XXXXX"  [Copies are on pages 121-122.]

Copies of calendars from September and October 2001 with notations of activities with which IVINS was involved. [Copies on page 123-124.]

Copy of an email to XXXXX in which IVINS suggests XXXXX or XXXXX may have been involved in the anthrax mailings.

Copy of an internet article from The Straight Dope.com regarding validity of handwriting analysis.

And there are other materials regarding handwriting analysis.  There are copies of all of them beginning on page 132 and ending on page 177.  Ivins appears to have printed them all out on May 10, 2005. 


Doc. #847545 (a.k.a. "File 10 of 59")

Pages 3 - 6 are an ABC news article about why innocent people confess to crimes they didn't commit.

Page 11 is a weird list about interacting with other people.  Examples: "(1) It's ALWAYS your fault."  "(3) My definition of good sportsmanship is beating you."  More on page 13.

Page 15 is some kind of weird handwritten poem.

Page 17 is a typed poem.

Pages 18 - 21  are a Baltimore Sun article from April 11, 2003, by Scott Shane: "Tests point to domestic source behind anthrax attacks."  Other articles follow.

Page 84 contains some information about a grand jury hearing in 2007.

Page 87 is a typed note about 3-4 trillion spores from RMR-1029 that were sent to Battelle in the spring of 2001.

Page 88 appears to be someone's description of Ivins' abilities and indicators of his personality.

Page 90 is an October 29, 2003 order from the commander of USAMRIID that no one should produce any "live dry agents of any type" without prior approval from the commander.

Page 93 is a signed letter by Ivins sent to the FBI about a March 31, 2005 interview where Ivins explains aspects of flask RMR-1029 and how it may have been stored in building 1412 for a time.  It says flask RMR-1029 may have been moved from building 1412 to building 1425 sometime before 2001.  He also says that lyophilized spores tend to clump and look "poor" when thawed.

6) Where the flasks of RMR 1029 were kept.  Since we had a lab (room 115) in Building 1412 at the time, and since the spores were intended for aerosols, it's possible that at least one of the flasks was kept in the lab refrigerator in 115 or in the 1st floor coldroom (much less likely) for a certain amount of time.  We were eventually - I think it was probably before 2001 - "moved out" of the area by Aerobiology, and at that point may have brought RMR 1029 material back to 1425.  I honestly don't remember, but it would make sense.

Page 96 is a 6/7/2007 email that Ivins sent to someone about people who he thought might be involved in the anthrax attacks.

Page 97 appears to be a handwritten list of motives by Ivins.

Page 106 appears to be an October 24, 2001 report that Ivins wrote, apparently after analyzing the Leahy spores.  It may also mention the Daschle powder, stating that it was far less pure.  It compares the results of analyzing two different powders.

A bunch of other test results follow, and on page 112 there is this paragraph:

SPS 02.266 (Leahy material) and SPS 02.88.01 (New York Post material) were indistinguishable in this heat stability test.  They were both statistically different from SPS 02.57.03 (Daschle material).

Pages 116 -118 appear to be a report from Ivins explaining why he swabbed down areas of his lab with bleach in December of 2001.  It's another copy of the "Hoover report."

Page 120 appears to be a list of Bacillus anthacis Ames strains in Ivins' laboratory.  Two of the items contain highlighted information:

4.  Fermentor-produced Ames spores from Dugway Proving Ground in 1997, XXXXX  Numerical designation = 7737.

5. Multiple-batch lot produced at USAMRIID from 11/20/95 to 11/18/96, Bruce Ivins and XXXXX.  Designation = Reference Material 1030.  Only about 1 ml left.

This appears to give the creation dates for flask RMR-1030, confirming that it was created by Ivins BEFORE the anthrax attacks of 2001.

Pages 121 - 123 are the results of some tests done by Ivins on 24 October 2001.

Page 124 has a title "Medium in which to produce B. Anthracis spores."  It is almost entirely redacted, except for the last sentence which is

"It appears that the optimal time for harvest of spores is between 1 and 2 days.

Page 125 has a title "Suggestions for a medium in which to produce B. anthracis spores.  It is almost entirely redacted, except for the last sentence which is:

"To make spores, use plenty of shaking or aeration, and spores should be ready to harvest in 1-3 days."

ONE to three days.  But it doesn't give a quantity.

Pages 130 - 133 contain some poems that probably contain a lot of information about the psychology of the writer.

Page 136 has a title "Original 1981 "Ames" slant from TVML"   It's difficult to understand, but seems to indicate that the slant was used to provide the seed material for Dugway in 1997 and also for flask RMR-1030. 

It appears to be a timeline, with 1985 at one side of the page and 2004 at the other.

Pages 139 - are an interview of someone that was transcribed on November 2, 2007, where the interviewee is asked about Ivins.  On page 144 the interviewee appears to say that she/he thinks that Ivins suspects he has become the target of the FBI's investigation.

Pages 153 -158 describe the start of the November 1, 2007 search, when FBI agents talked with Dr. Ivins without his attorney in an office that was apparently near the entrance to the building in which Ivins worked.  They apparently stopped him as he was arriving for the day.  They talked about how Dr. Ivins' April 2002 submission to FBIR was supposed to be from flask RMR-1029 but did not appear to be from flask RMR-1029.  Ivins provides a variety of explanations for the error.

At one point, Dr. IVINS tried to explain that he was accustomed to performing single colony picks, and this may be why his submission did not genetically appear to be RMR-1029.

           Dr. IVINS was then told that based on previous statements to investigators this did not make any sense.   The interviewing agents reminded Dr. IVINS of guidance and statements he had provided investigators in the past.

       *   He knew prior to the submission that there were similarities between RMR-1029 and the mailing material.

       *   He instructed the FBI to look at the morphological variants.

       *   He knew the importance of the FBI's need for a representative sample to conduct the investigation. 

       *   He knew that XXXXXX would be analyzing the material on the behalf of the FBI.

       *   Never before had he been subpoenaed to provide material to the FBI investigation.

Based upon these statements the interviewing agents advised Dr. IVINS that providing a single colony pick to the FBI would be completely contradictory to the guidance he had provided to the FBI to identify the source of the anthrax from the mailings.

Page 156 and 157 include two intriguing paragraphs:

          During the middle of the interview with Dr. IVINS, and to change the direction of the conversation, Dr. IVINS was requested to identify who was XXXXX.  Upon hearing the name, Dr. IVINS immediately pushed away from the table, crossed his arms and legs, exerted what he claimed to be a Fifth Amendment privilege, and refused to discuss anything about the name.

          Dr. IVINS was informed that the investigators were unaware of any case connections between the name and the mailing of the anthrax letters.  Again, Dr. IVINS stated that he would not comment on the name in question.     

And also on page 157 there's this:

          During additional conversations with Dr. IVINS, a reference was made regarding Dr. IVINS' being an "expert" in the field of studies of Bacillus anthracis.  Dr. IVINS took defense to the statement claiming that he was not an "expert."  Dr. IVINS was told his claim was unrealistic based upon his accomplishments, at which Dr. IVINS sat at his seat shaking his head in disagreement with the statement.

Page 193 - 199 is another interview with Dr. Ivins.  This one was done on January 16, 2008, and it focuses mainly on Ivins' obsession with the  KKG sorority.

On page 199 there is this paragraph:

IVINS cannot recall taking leave on September 17, 2001, and, therefore, cannot recall why he did so.

Pages 200 - 210 appear to be a report on the search of Dr. Ivins' home on the night of November 1, 2007.

Pages 211 - 227 are various logs by the photographer taking pictures during the search of November 1, 2007, and other logs of the items examined or taken.


Doc. #847547 (a.k.a. "File 02 of 59")

Pages 10 - 17 dated 2/13/08 is a summary of an FBI interview with Ivins on that date.   It contains details of his visits to sorority houses where he stole a cipher book.

Page 17 contains this:

Ivins eventually explained that XXXXXXX would make several subcultures, or serial passage the organism when growing them.  This caused variants or mutations to appear.  Ivins did not use serial passages.  Rather, his cultures were all grown from the original slant provided to USAMRIID by the USDA, thereby preventing the creation of variants or mutations.

Pages 18 - 23 dated 2/17/08 include someone's analysis of the handwriting on the New York Post letter and specifically the highlighted T's and A's.  He also notices the strange ways R's are drawn.  He/She thinks the handwriting may be that of a non-English person.

Page 43 - 48 dated March 1, 2007, is an examination of the times between August 2 and October 5, 2001 when Ivins was in USAMRIID Building 1425 at the same time someone else was there, too.  But they never seemed to be in the same room at the same time.

Pages 49 - 103  are badge reader (In-Out log) access times for August 1, 2001, to Oct. 10. 2001.  But they are only evening hours.  All PMs.

Page 110 contains a report on KKG council members recalling the harassment from someone named "Bruce Ivans".

Pages 121 -125 dated 11/06/07 are an account of the time when Dr. Ivins was informed that his home was going to be searched, and he was provided with an hotel room for the night that this would be happening.  It was all done at night so that the media and Ivins' neighbors would not notice anything unusual.

Pages 136 -137 dated 3/26/2008 describes an incident when Ivins showed up at work with a black eye.  It also describes an incident were some anthrax was spilled.

Page 138 dated 3/28/08 describes Ivins first suicide attempt.


Doc. #847551(a.k.a. "File 05 of 59")

Page 3 - 6 dated 05/07/2008 contains a list of porn materials and panties that Ivins threw in to the trash.

Page 8 dated 5/13/2008  describes an incident where Ivins was sitting in a car in front of some co-worker's home.  He talks about some event in March and how he's going to go into a mental hospital for a month.

Page 9 - 13 describes a March 25, 2008, incident where Ivins seemed to be threatening people over something, and it's also about his fascination with a younger woman.

Page 19 contains an email dated May 27, 2007 where Ivins (using a false name) talks about being grilled for hours by at a grand jury session that was very accusatory.

Page 24 contains a message dated July 1, 2007, where Ivins had to get another attorney because of "two grand jury sessions from hell."  He mentions getting a letter titled "United States versus Bruce E. Ivins."  He says he hasn't enjoyed going to work in years.

Page 28 contains another email dated May 23, 2007, which describes two sessions before a grand jury and how they asked "gotcha" questions.

Page 33 contains another email dated May 14, 2007, about going before a grand jury.

Page 39 is part of an email apparently dated June 10, 2007, which says he was accused "of diluting, altering or adulterating an important preparation of anthrax material."  He says "The grand jury was also very accusatory."

Page 42 dated June 4, 2008, is a summary of someone's statements that Ivins hated New York City and knew a lot about codons.

Page 44 - 45 dated January 8, 2008, is a summary of someone's statements that Ivins had some kind of "consuming desire to re-enter the 'hot suite'"    And he whined because he wasn't allowed to do it.  There's also information about how Ivins didn't want anyone to learn how he did things.

Page 47 dated January 8, 2008: "Since his last interview with the FBI, Ivins has on occasion spontaneously declared at work, 'I could never intentionally kill or hurt someone.'"

Page 54 dated June 25 and 26, 2008: "Ivins' attorney told him that an indictment is coming and to be prepared to face the death penalty."

Page 60 dated May 28, 2008, says someone was not at work on 9/11/01 but came in to work on the 12th.  It also mentions Ivins' moods.

Page 62 dated May 28, 2008, talks about Ivins holding grudges and his various political views.  He repeats that Ivins hated New York City and the New York Yankees.  It suggests that Ivins hung a note on someone's door that said "FBI rat."

Page 65 dated May 28, 2008, says:

"Things slowed down and there wasn't a lot of work in the lab in the latter part of 2001.

"XXXX can think of no reason for Ivins to be working long nighttime hours in the August to October 2001 time-frame. There was not much work going on in Ivins' lab at that time and the only study being conducted was the guinea pig strain study, which may have required entry into the suites to check on animals. However, checking the animals would only have taken approximately 30 minutes."

Pages 66 - 69 contain an interview with someone after some kind of meeting where Ivins was present.  This is reported by the interviewee:

          According to IVINS, he had been away from detox/substance abuse treatment.  He used to go to his room and drink vodka in combination with Lunesta, Ambien, or Unisom until he blacked out.  Then, he drank more when he woke up and sometimes would call in sick to work.

          Sometimes IVINS would wake up with car keys in his hand.  One time he fell and bloodied his nose, and XXXXX

          When IVINS was in this "state" he would send off emails to people.

           IVINS reported he had a blood alcohol level of 0.3 to 0.4.  The hospital put him in touch with a substance abuse counselor.  He then went to an outpatient service at Suburban Hospital and next, an inpatient treatment at Massi.

          XXXXX relayed that it sounded like IVINS was going to AA, his psychologist, and seeing someone named XXXXX whom he connected with at Frederick Hospital.

         XXXXXX of which he acted like he didn't remember very much.  Additionally, he didn't remember telling the FBI that XXXXX did it [mailed the anthrax letters].  XXXXX noted that IVINS seemed to forget a lot of things.

          XXXXX asked IVINS a question along the lines of: could "the other BRUCE" have mailed the letters?  XXXXX didn't recall him saying "no," nor did he take offense to the question.  It seemed to XXX as if he had thought of that before.

          IVINS told XXXXX that his attorney told him that with his dealings with the FBI, sometimes IVINS plays a puppy that wants to appease, and sometimes he plays junior-detective.  IVINS has spent over $100 thousand dollars from his retirement fund, on his attorney.  The next time IVINS has to testify, he will have to have a proffer.  According to IVINS, the JAG on post wont allow anyone to talk to his attorneys.

Pages 70 - 77 are a report about an "off the record" interview with Bruce Ivins and his lawyers on June 9, 2008.  (This report was later removed from the FBI's on-line pdf file.)

Page 70 contains this description of Ivins' methods for creating cultures. 

"When growing spores, Ivins and those in his laboratory streak a plate and pick a single representative colony from the plate to inoculate a growth medium.  This ensures all the subcultures are identical and do not have morphological variants.   Using the single colony pick also ensures any contaminants present on the plate are not introduced into the growth medium.  If one were to swipe across the plate and use those spores to inoculate the growth medium, the resulting spore growth would have variants.  Therefore, Ivins would expect that all of his subcultures, including RMR-1029, are homogenous and free of variants."

Page 71: In January 2002, Ivins was provided with a photograph of the spores that were sent through the mail which also showed the variants in the spores. 

"Ivins also drew diagrams to explain the difference between spores grown using his single colony pick method and those grown otherwise.  When Ivins drew the diagrams and typed the captions under the photographs, the information he was providing honestly reflected his thinking at that time.  Namely, spores grown using his method, including RMR-1029, were free of morphological variants and did not resemble the spores which were mailed."

"In 2000, Ivins was diagnosed with clinical depression and began taking medication for it."

Page 72: Ivins repeats that he doesn't think that his method for creating spores would create variants.

Page 73: Ivins says certain co-workers could have made the attack anthrax. 

Page 74 gives reasons why Ivins hated New York City.

"Ivins was provided a copy of the anthrax-laden letter which was mailed to the New York Post and Tom Brokaw and asked if anything stood out to him.  Ivins said the writer 'can't make R's,' has a 'problem with T's.' and 'can't spell penicillin.'  It is his opinion the writing looks like that of a second grader, and he questioned the need for writing '09-11-01' at the top of the letter."   

Page 74 & 75: Ivins knowledge of condons is discussed in detail.  "Goedel, Escher, Bach" is discussed with Ivins.  He claims he didn't read as far as page 404 where the code in the letters is described. 

Page 77 describes Ivins' claims about why he submitted a homemade slant instead of following protocols.

Pages 110 - 111 contain a June 27, 2008 interview with someone where this is  reported:

          XXXXX was asked about an Apple computer IVINS lost sometime around 2002.  XXXXX stated that the loss of a computer was a rare event.  Additionally, IVINS does not use Apple computers.

Page 117 dated July 15, 2008, describes Ivins threatening to kill his co-workers in a therapy session on the evening of July 9, 2008.  He also discussed suicide.

Ivins stated he was tired of the investigation and that killing certain co-workers would take care of it.

Page 163 - 169 dated July 1, 2008, is a bunch of emails where Ivins describes his background and a lot of college things.


Doc. #847572 (a.k.a. "File 25 of 59")

Page 14 is a Washington Times article from April 18, 2002, about handwriting analysis.  Other news articles follow.

Page 43 is the FBI report of Ivins being taken away in an ambulance after he committed suicide on the evening of July 26-27, 2008. 

Page 46 - 47 obituaries.

Page 49 shows efforts to keep Ivins locked up in a mental hospital failed.

Pages 70 - 90 or so, lots of mentions of Ivins having a "hit list."

Page 124: Ivins says he tried to commit suicide and tries to pull out his life support tubes.

Page 125 describes how the call from the Ivins home was an assist fire call, not a suicide attempt call, so the proper paperwork for an attempted suicide was not done.

Page 127 - 133 appear to be a conversation with someone at the CDC, most likely the person who received Ivins' email of the 4th of October.  The person says he called Ivins back on the 5th.  Ivins seemed upset and anxious because there was so little information about the  Stevens case.  

Page 128 describes someone's thoughts about why the second mailing went out and how Ivins didn't know for certain that he had killed Bob Stevens.

Page 129 begins with an evaluation of Ivins' abilities.  A good scientist, but not a genius.

Page 132 mentions "acetone drying" as a way of drying spores.  It's done that way at Dugway.

This person from the CDC emailed the FBI on August 7, 2008, after learning of Ivins' death.  In the email he discussed the unauthorized cleanings, etc.


Doc. #897541 (a.k.a. "File 17 of 59")

File contains only one document about files being "bookmarked."



Amerithrax Part 31.pdf

This file contains one interview after another of USAMRIID employees (and possibly others) beginning in November 2001 and through the contamination incident of April 2002.

Date: 11/09/2001 (probably an interview with John Ezzell) - Page 1: Ft. Detrick was home to the United States offensive biological weapons program until President Nixon discontinued the program in 1969.

USAMRIID first obtained the Ames strain in the early 1980's.  A researcher named XXXXXX obtained the strain from a veterinary lab in Ames, Iowa.  The lab obtained the sample from a cow that had died of anthrax a short time before.

Page 2: XXXX pointed out that the origins of the Ames strain are unclear.  Some sources believe it was first discovered in the bovine outbreak of the early 1980's.  Others believe it first appeared in the 1950's.  In addition, strains of anthrax may be virtually indistinguishable from one another.  Two samples isolated in Texas and one in Haiti are identical to the Ames strain.

Page 3: Employees with access to select agents can be alone with the material.  There are no searches or checks to prevent this.  Material can be removed.  XXXXX added that it would be virtually impossible to completely secure the materials.  Trace amounts could be removed without detection.

The material found in the New York Post letter seemed to be made in a centrifuge, which would be the cause of the three layers of different colors in that sample.  The black and tan layers were under the white, which was almost pure spore material.

Page 4: Allowing the material to dry slowly, rather than freeze drying, will allow crystals to form.  This can be accomplished by loosening the cap of the desiccator jar, and placing gauze over the top of the tube.  Left in a biosafety cabinet with a vacuum on for a couple days, the material will dry into clumps at the bottom of the tube.  It can then be broken up and is ready for dissemination.  [He] believed that the clumps of material found in the samples recovered in this case help verify this theory.  The observation that silica may be present in some recovered samples may be explained by the fact that silicone is often used to seal desiccator jars, and some may have made its way into the spore material.  The presence of calcium carbonate and iron in some samples may be due to the subject using tap water to rinse the material during the production process. 

Page 6 - Interview dated 12/17/2001 is a series of questions and answers, possibly with someone at Dugway:  Question 4.  Do you, or have you done, work with the Ames strain?  If so, where did you obtain the culture?

Answer: Yes, Our culture came from USAMRIID.  I believe Bruce Ivins probably got it from a research facility at Ames, Iowa. 

Page 13 interview dated 01/29/2002 also says the Ames strain came from Iowa.

Page 14: XXX also believed it would be easier to try to recover a sample of B. anthacis from nature than to try to remove it from a US lab.

Discusses a problem from 10 years ago and ways to steal anthrax out of a lab.

Page 15:  XXXX guessed that there were probably fewer than one hundred people who are capable of manufacturing and sending out the spores found in the letters.

Page 17 interview dated 01/22/2002: Bacillus anthracis could be mutated by passing it through several dilutions.  It would be just as virulent after the mutations as the un-mutated version.

There are three AMES strains of Bacillus anthracis at USAMRIID from the same stock obtained from Iowa in the 1980's.  XXXXXXX Bruce Ivins, has the original slant.

Page 19: Interview from Jan. 22, 2002 dated 02/01/02: XXXX heard in the news about the missing material from the early 1990's at USAMRIID.  It is [his] understanding that the samples were prepared for electron microscopy, and it would not be possible to get any useful material out of it.

Page 20: USAMRIID employees are not supposed to work late at night.  Sometimes, quick "in and out" work is necessary on weekends for research projects.

Last paragraph talks about "avirulent Ames."

Page 22 - Interview from Jan. 24, 2002 dated 02/02/02:  A badge is required to get into the dressing room.  There are two footpads that must be stepped on in sequence.  An alarm sounds to the security people if two people go through on one person's code.  The keypad requires each individual to enter a code assigned solely to them.

Page 30 interview from 1/19/2002 transcribed on 1/24/2002: XXXX did not believe that someone with a Bachelor's degree in microbiology would have the necessary skills to create the spores used in the letters.  Few Master's level individuals could do it unless their specific field of study involved sporulation.  Most holders of PhD's in Microbiology would probably have a broad enough base of knowledge to create the spores.  Such individuals could be found in industry, universities, research institutions, or performing clinical work.

Also discusses how difficult it would be to get a sample of Ames from nature

Page 31 & 32 discussed lots of details about making spores AND weaponizing them.

Page 34-35: Identifying strains is a complicated process.  Two identical isolates may be been obtained from different sources and carry different labels.  For instance, the samples from the anthrax letters match Ames.  They do not match Vollum, for example, but may match any number of other isolates and/or strains.  This [his] knowledge, genetic sequencing has not yet progressed to the point where these similarities and differences can all be identified and cataloged.  At this time, he does not believe it can be determined how "unique" Ames is, or where else it has traveled.  Since it originated in Texas, it would be difficult to determine where else it may have been distributed from the Texas source, or to whom the NVSL may have distributed it, besides USAMRIID. 

Page 36 has someone else saying that the Ames strain came from Iowa.  He/she also explains how easy it is to steal a quantity of spores and demonstrates some ignorance of how mutations occur.

Page 38: The only opportunity to circumvent security that he knew of would be to work after hours, when no one else was around.

Page 42:  XXXX stated that as to motive, the only division that has benefited at USAMRIID post-September 11th is the Diagnostic Systems Division.  They have received increased funding for their research, because they played such a big role in the current crisis.

Page 45: After leaving the suites you are not searched and could easily carry something out of the building.

Page 48: It is difficult to initially obtain access to the suites, but once you have been granted access, only a person's integrity would prevent them from removing something from the suite.

Page 51: XXXX advised that theft of a biological agent from the facility was easy.  People could walk out of the facility with the agent on their person, but access to the "bugs" is limited on a "need" basis.  In order to steal the agent you would need access to the stock.

Page 54: more of the same, plus: XXXX told the interviewing agent that after reading the paragraph of the February 4, 2002, TIME magazine article, where BARBARA ROSENBERG was discussing the profile of the individual responsible for the Anthrax letters, XXXXXX [6 letters, probably EZZELL] immediately came to mind.

Page 60: more of the same.

Page 61 has an interview dated Feb. 6, 2002 where someone says the Ames strain came from Texas.

Page 68 has an interview dated Jan. 25, 2002 where someone says the Ames strain came from Iowa.

Page 70 is the start of an interview done on April 19, 2002, which goes into the contamination from the leaky flask and how Ivins without authorization did some tests of his own to look for contamination outside of suite B-3.

Page 72: XXXX also stopped XXXX from discussing a story regarding DR. IVINS' unhealthy interest in a female he was putatively stalking.

Page 83 has more about how easy it is to take material out of USAMRIID.

Page 95 has more of the same.

Page 98 has more of the same.

Page 102 has more of the same.

Pages 106-107 are another report from April where Ivins' activities after the contamination incident are described.

Page 110:  On Wednesday, 04/17/02 XXXXXXXXXX IVINS stated something to the effect of it would be interesting to see what was laying around this facility. XXXXX


XXXX stated that IVINS usually thinks things through before acting XXXXX does not think he thought through is act of swabbing areas on the "cold side," or general traffic area, of the labs XXXXX knows of no swabbing IVINS did prior to April 2002.  XXXX knows of no testing of evidence he has done that was unauthorized.

AMERITHRAX Part 32.pdf
(link to a link)

Pages 1-3 are an interview report from 04/24/2002 (transcribed 04/29/2002) about the contamination incident, where Ivins did unauthorized cleanups and testing.  Page 3 says they found one spore atop a locker in the men's changing room and one spore on a bookshelf in Ivins' office.

Page 9 contains a lengthy description of how Ivins would prepare spores for aerosol testing in building 1412.

Page 9: Once the tubes and plates in the incubator had been checked for colonies, they would have been placed in a garbage bag under one of the hoods to be autoclaved.  XXXX advised that they could have sat in the bag for weeks.

Page 11: Because of the nature of their job and the number of night and weekend animal deaths, veterinarians have access to every hot suite at USAMRIID.

Page 13 describes how freezers work, and how an alarm sounds of the door is left open too long.

Page 15 describes some new security procedures as of 10/08/2002, including a rule that everyone must work with a "buddy," and how USAMRIID has its own medical unit. 

Page 16: XXXX does not think that an incubator, shaker, or lyophilizer would have been necessary to prepare the type of dry spores that were seen in the anthrax letters.

Page 27 describes details about Bruce Ivins Sept. 18, 2001 trip to Covance.  It says "Ivins was an awful driver," and that may indicate he didn't drive on the trip, even though he's the one who signed out the vehicle.  The trip included lunch at a restaurant some of the people (including Ivins) liked.  Page 29-30 has the vehicle use form signed by Ivins.

Page 34 seems to indicate that the same passbox is used by scientists in suites B-3 and B-4.  The passbox is in a "no glove" area.

Page 35: Bacteriology and Diagnostic Services Division (DSD) to not get along with each other.

Page 43 says there were two copy machines at USAMRIID.  One in the library and the other "located by the rear entrance to building 1425.

Page 47 describes Ivins "heat shocking" spores prior to tests.  It seems that only one lab at USAMRIID made spores on agar plates.

Page 61: XXXXX knows that the Ames strain will not be obtained through Dugway because since the mailings of the anthrax letters, Dugway will no longer supply USAMRIID.

Pages 63 & 64 SEEM to discuss making DRY spores.  But it's an error and on page 66 the interviewee contacts the FBI and tells him those dry spores were irradiated. 

The 1% phenol solution kept the live spores from growing and maintained the live spores.  Love spores can be stored in this manner for up to five years without much maintenance.  Spores maintained in water needed to be re-washed and re-enumerated every two weeks as spores tend to grow when kept in water.

Page 78 has another description of how easy it would be to smuggle something out of USAMRIID.

Page 88, dated Jan. 25, 2006, is the first interview where Bruce Ivins seems to be a suspect and questions are asked about him.  A copy of an email between Ivins and someone else is obtained.

Page 89, dated Jan. 19, 2006, mentions an email from KingBadger7@aol.com which Ivins sent and mentioned that he had been interviewed "over 30 times" by the FBI.

Page 90: On March 29, 2006, someone is asked if they ever saw flask RMR-1029.

Page 91 mentioned that Ivins was odd and refers to his "home life" versus his "work life."  The bottom of the page says, XXXX stated the animal caretakers were the individuals that ran the autoclave, however, [she] did not recall any of the caretakers names.  [She] was not aware of the destruction protocols.

Page 92 mentions some "power hungry person" and rumors about Ivins.

Page 103 contains an interview from 2005 where someone tells the FBI about a time that Bruce Ivins showed [her] a flask full of spores.

At the time, XXXX wasn't sure if Ivins was serious or not, and thought he may have just been playing a game with [her] because it was [her] first introduction to the hot suites.

Page 104 describes how frustrated people at USAMRIID were with the FBI investigating them and asking questions all the time.

Page 107 from 2006: XXXXX opined the elemental signature of biological agents might provide clues to the method of production.  For example, Bacillus anthracis spores that were grown on agar plates ought to contain trace elements unique to the agar.  For small scale Bacillus anthracis spore preparations, the agar plate method is the preferred method for spore production.

Page 108 from 2006: IVINS had a "different personality"; however,he was professionally competent.


Amerithrax Part 33.pdf

Page 8 has an interview from 2006 where it's said that "after the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001, IVINS's personality differed as he was not the same jovial guy."

IVINS had indicated XXXXX that he was certain the Federal Bureau of Investigation was listening to IVINS's telephonic conversations at home and at work.  XXXXX opined the civilian scientists at USAMRIID were patriotic, and the fact that the investigation being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation continued to focus on USAMRIID was deemed unfair.

Page 14 is and interview from November 2006 where the FBI asks for any emails from Ivins' various email accounts.

Page 17: IVINS has remarked he continues to work at USAMRIID because he is otherwise financially responsible for XXXXXX health insurance.

Page 21: IVINS was also Catholic but XXXXX commented that IVINS was more of a moderate or mainstream Catholic now.  In the past, IVINS was known to be a more strict Catholic.

Pages 22-23 from 2006: Just before and during the Anthrax mailings in 2001, XXXX was not aware of any researcher that [he] worked with in the hot suites of building XXXX that conducted research on a project that required them to work extended hours, late nights or weekends.   XXXX advised that a researcher may have to go into the lab on weekends or at night to check up on an experiment, but would not spend much time in the hot suites.

Page 24 from December 2006: Because of USAMRIID's Personal Reliability Program (PRP), IVINS was identified as having a type of medical problem.  XXXX did not know the specifics but IVINS was not allowed in the hot suites for approximately one month in 2006, due to some type of problems with taking depression medication.  XXXX did not know how IVINS' problem was finally resolved that allowed IVINS access back into the hot suites.  The PRP program was not in effect in 2001.

Page 30 from 2006: Individual opined it was the perception of these senior scientists that the FBI was treating them as suspects in the antharx-laced letter mailings of 2001.

Page 31 from 2006: Individual reiterated it was well known to most [Bacteriology] Division employees that IVINS has a fascination with sororities.  Years ago IVINS took an interest in a fellow Bacteriology Division co-worker's neice, and queried the co-worker as to whether or not the niece participated in a sorority specific event.   

Page 44: XXXX estimated that in 2002, Bacteriology Division had 60-70 employees of which two were secretaries.  Fifteen of the employees were allowed in the hot suites.

Page 45 (from a January 18, 2007 interview) contains a long paragraph about Ivins being mentioned in the newspapers and on TV because of "a cold side incident."  The paragraph says that Ivins was "generally a good person."

Page 46 has more information about the month Ivins was barred from the hot suites.  And this:  IVINS liked to talk and say things to get a reaction out of people.  XXXX would be aggravated by IVINS because of his lack in work ethic.

Page 47: IVINS discussed the mental illness of IVINS mother.  IVINS thought that Schizophrenia may have been in his family.  IVINS never made a comparison of himself with his mothers mental illness.

XXXXX has observed IVINS in depressed states over the years.  When IVINS' name appears in the newspapers, he becomes depressed.

There's also information about Ivins' drinking.

Page 48 from 2007:  Everyone who works with IVINS thinks of him as their crazy uncle.  IVINS is not hateful, just inappropriate and off color.

XXXXXX recalled a strange comment by IVINS in which IVINS wanted to have a hero/villain party.  IVINS suggested he dress as an abortion doctor and let other people decide if he was a hero [or] villain.

Page 49:  Regarding other ways to dry Ba, XXXX thought that placing the wet material under the hood may achieve dried Ba, but it would take a long time.  

Page 50: The group of people from the office that go drinking on Thursdays after work at the Glory Days Grill are IVINS, xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Page 61 contains more comments about the contamination incident and Ivins role in it.

Page 79 from March 2007:  XXXXX recalled that IVINS made jokes about sororities and fraternities in general.  He would normally ask someone if they were part of either one.

When questioned about knowing anyone that would be at USAMRIID hot suites after hours, XXXXX replied that IVINS was known to take daily showers at USAMRIID in order to save money.

Page 80: After reviewing the XXXX hot suite access charts, XXXXX was unable to explain the extended late night and weekend hours for XXXXXXX IVINS.  XXXXX explained that when [he] went into the hot suites after hours or on weekends XXXXXXXXXX it took [him] longer to drive to and from work, get dressed to enter the hot suites and shower up after entering the hot suites, then to perform the actual task within the hot suites.

Page 81: XXXXX thought that because it would take a long time to dry Ba by letting it dry under a hood, that someone would notice and report it as a safety violation.

Page 86 from January 2007:  Ivins could be annoying when trying to be funny.  He sends via email pictures of kittens and funny pictures.  He loves cats but can't have cats.  He got a rabbit for his kids.

Page 87: Ivins is falling apart physically.  

Ivins loves woment with long hair.

IVINS has stated that LYNDON B. JOHNSON was the worst US President ever.

Page 89:  IVINS would come in to the "hot suites" at USAMRIID and take showers because his kids used all the hot water, then Ivins would stay and do paperwork.  That was normal, IVINS still showers late at night at USAMRIID, according to XXXXX.

Page 96 contains another mention of the copy machine located near the rear entrance to building 1425.

Page 106 begins an interview dated May 8, 2007, which is probably with a relative or friend of Ivins in Ohio and not someone from USAMRIID. 

Page 107: XXXXX described XXXXXX BRUCE EDWARDS IVINS (BRUCE) as very intelligent but not self disciplined.

Bruce was born in 1946 and was a good child.  XXXXX knew BRUCE to be a big NASCAR fan.  .......   XXXXX stated that BRUCE wanted everyone to worship the gorund he walked on due to him receiving his PhD.


Amerithrax Part 34.pdf (link to a link)

 Page 1: Security guards had almost no power to really secure the facility and were not allowed to search anyone coming in or out.  XXXXX commented there was no way guards would know if someone was taking something such as a pathogen out of the facility.  XXXXX added it would have been very difficult to search someone because unless the security officer had spent time in the laboratory, the would no know what to look for.  In addition, there was no x-ray machine in use at the time [she] worked at USAMRIID to search items coming in or out of the facility.

Page 2: the doors opened automatically and would remain open for thirty seconds to one minute, allowing anyone to pass through the doors without using their security badge; the power was always going out to the buildings and although the doors were supposed to lock in the event of a power failure, they did not always lock and in any event could be pushed open; several cameras did not work or were fuzzy and several of the monitors were off completely.

Page 7 starts another interview with someone in Ohio who knew Ivins when he was younger.

Page 8: XXXXXX used to call IVINS "SNIVI", the name IVINS spelled backward, which is what IVINS' father gave the name to their own brand of vitamins.

XXXXX went on one date with IVINS, but did not like him.

IVINS was not a "physical specimen" and XXXX believed IVINS had scoliosis and thought he wore a neck brace in college.  Ivins always walked very square.

Page 18 from August 30, 2007: XXXXX thought BRUCE IVINS to be indiscrete and to shoot his mouth of, the "ability to filter was gone with him.

XXXXX recalled BRUCE IVINS stating that "if Frederick only knew what we worked with" and "if someone put enough on the head of a pin and took it into Safeway it would wipe out Frederick."   XXXXX described BRUCE IVINS as "very, very different" and that IVINS "is the mad professor."

XXXXX stated BRUCE IVINS had no social circle stating "I've never met a friend of his."

Page 20 begins a report on interviews done at a publishing company -- possibly the company that publishes the American Family Journal, where Ivins learned about the Greendale 4th grader incident.  The magazine publisher is located in Greendale.

Page 24 dated Dec. 6, 2006:  Ivins office desk contains miscellaneous current and historical paperwork as IVINS does not have a filing cabinet, nor is he known for keeping laboratory notes.  It is likely that throughout the paperwork on his desk are papers derived from a USAMRIID photocopy machine.  Prior to September 2001, in the back of USAMRIID building 1425, where the current security check-in window is, was a doorway which entered a room that contained multiple copy machines.

IVINS has a tendency to create mathematical errors as recently demonstrated in an email he sent to Bacteriology Division co-workers.  The email documented IVINS results from a recent experiment and contained an obvious mathematical error.  Individual opined perhaps it was his disorganized nature, with respect to his: office, work space, and residence, which contributed to his mathematical error.

Page 48 from an interview on November 8, 2007:  When XXXX first arrived at USAMRIID in XXXXX was aware that USAMRIID had taken "big hits" after the Gulf War, but not one at USAMRIID was concerned about the funding or direction of the research.  XXXXX commented, however, that getting money for research in science is part of the job, even in the miliatry.  At the time of the 2001 anthrax attacks, the focus at USAMRIID was on Glanders research.  In 2004, when XXXXXXXX came along everyone could see it would bring a lot of money into the facility.

The report also says "everyone at USAMRIID worked unusual hours."

Page 50 of the interview says some person is convinced "the Russians" are behind the 2001 anthrax attacks.

Page 53 begins a December 6, 2007 interview where Ivins is viewed as a suspect because of how he lied to the FBI.  The interviewee says Ivins had "a criminal mind."

Page 54: Ivins frequently wrote joke poems in which he tried to disguise his writing by printing in block letters and using words cut out of a magazine.

XXXXX believed that if IVINS was the anthrax mailer he would have kept the original notes.

Page 71 from January 29, 2008: IVINS enjoyed being an expert but did not relish taking on any kind of leadership role or roles which required significant decision making responsibilities.

XXXXXXX recalled that prior to September 11, 2001, there was a shift away from anthrax-vaccine research and more towards anthrax diagnostic and therapeutic research.  XXXXXXX also recalled that prior to September 11, 2001, and even as early as 1998 there was ample funding opportunities for glanders research as that was routinely identified as a bio-defense research gap by the Department of Defense.

XXXXXXX was specifically queried to confirm or deny the validity of the following statement: if PIs within the XXXXXXXXXXX have said to writer that prior to September 11, 2001, that the rPA vaccine work had run its course and they were asked to shift to different research work.  XXXXXXX affirmed that to be a valid statement.

Page 72 contains a lot of detail about what kind of research was going on and what kind was being cut back.

XXXXX explained that "hobby scientists" as those government scientists who were more interested and motivated to continue conducting research which suited their own individual motivations and comfort zone as opposed to pro-actively seeking to address those postings which address specific research gaps.

Page 74 begins a Feb. 6, 2008 interview with someone in Lebanon, Ohio, looking into Ivins' background.  There are similar interviews on following pages.  One indicates they were looking for something that might have happened to Ivins in fourth grade.

Page 108 from May 5, 2008, mentions that Ivins gave a seminar on anthrax about six months after the attack.  He claimed he was the one who opened the Daschle letter.  He talked repeatedly about how good the powder was.

Page 112 mentions Ivins "stalking" some female co-worker and refers to an earlier report where this was mentioned.

Page 113 from June 4, 2008 (probably John Ezzell): "If anyone at USAMRIID did this, it would be Bruce."  XXXXX further advised it XXXXXX opinion that the block style handwriting on the threat letter matched up closer to IVINS's than anyone else's regarding the block style of printing.

XXXXXX opined that the New York mailings of the anthrax-laced letters mailing of 2001 were an early attempt whereas the Washington, D.C., mailings were a second or more refined attempt.  XXXXXX continued on the New York Post and Brokaw anthrax was chunky and multi-colored; blackish, dark tan and whitish.  XXXXXX opined that anthrax-spores that have been centrifuged display this multi-layered appearance.  The Daschle and Leahy anthrax was not chunky, nor did it have a multi-colored appearance, to which XXXXXX opined suggested that the anthrax-spores were further purified.

Pages 114 and 115 contain more such information and a discussion of how Ivins examined the Daschle letter.  

Page 116 discusses when Ivins learned about the "morphs."

Page 117: XXXXXX stated "if anybody at USAMRIID [perpetrated the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001], it would have been IVINS."  XXXXXX continued "only IVINS had the setup to produce the quantity of spores that were used in those letters."


Amerithrax Part 35.pdf (link to a link)

Page 1 starts a December 5, 2001 list of 42 "individuals [who] had published or contributed to, research on anthrax."   Most had "No access to hot suites."  Some "Not longer at USAMRIID."  The others were interviewed in late 2001.  Only Ivins' name is not redacted.

Page 14 seems to be the start of a March 4, 2002 report from the New Orleans office of the FBI on what they found in their jurisdiction (presumably Louisiana State University, but the abbreviated name has 4 characters.)

Page 31 mentions confusion about the origins of the Ames strain.

There are dozens and dozens of pages of in-out logs to the BSL-3 suite at LSU.

Page 104 is a report from the Salibury Medical Bulletin (date unknown, but probably before 2000) titled "Incidence of anthrax and environmental detection of Bacillus anthracis in the UK."

Page 105 had a brief report titled "Anthrax in Russia."  It says they get an average of 440 human cases per year. 

An average of 230 cases of anthrax in humans had been observed annually from 268 in 1983 to 176 in 1989.

Pages 106-107 contain an ad for "Portable R&D Grinding System" which could presumably be used to mill anthrax.


Amerithrax Part 36.pdf (link to a link)

Page 1 is an FBI report from August 13, 2003, where people are notified that the FBI needs to get the original Ames slant from Ivins and put it in the FBI repository.

Page 4 is the Sept. 9, 2003 FBI report on what the did with the slant obtained from Ivins.

Page 15 contains a May 21, 2004 description of how and why the contents of flask RMR-1029 were created.

One entry [in Ivins' notebook] displayed a letter sent from XXXXX to Dugway, and detailed the terms of the agreement that involved USAMRIID shipping 4 vials of Ba Ames spores to Dugway.  Using these vials, Dugway would grow a total of approximately 10 batches, or 30 trillion spores, which would then be sent as approximately 10 individual shipments to USAMRIID.

Page 16 says that Dugway shipped seven batches between April 23 and October 24, 1997, but the seventh shipped on Oct. 24 was "dirty" and useless, so Ivins destroyed it. 

Diugway didn't have any ability to irradiate spores and would sent spores to USAMRIID for them to do it.

Pages 24 and 25 have information from Ivins' notebook #4010 which describes the seven shipments of spores received from Dugway.

Page 32 is an FBI report from Dec. 9, 2004 where the FBI learned that on 07/31/1999 Ivins got a traffic ticket (for failing to stop at a stop sign) and paid a $70 fine.   It also says that on 10/08/2000 Ivins was the victim of a robbery.  There's no information about what was stolen.

Page 44 contains an FBI report of an agent performing surveillance on Ivins' home at 10:55 a.m. on April 10, 2005, making a note of the vehicle on or near the property.

Page 47 says another surveillance check was done on April 7.

Page 48 says another surveillance check was done on April 5.

Page 49 says that an NCIC search was done on Bruce Ivins that resulted in finding 22 reports about him.  Apparently all routine stuff.

Page 54 has a report from June 14, 2005, which suggests the Postal Service may have been checking Ivins mail.

Page 55 has a report from June 27, 2005, which shows the FBI was checking on Ivins Internet connections.  They seem to want to see if Ivins visited any anthrax victims' web sites.

Page 56 has a report from June 29, 2005, where they learned that Ivins had been discussing his mental history, claiming that his psychiatrist believes he has a Paranoid Personality Disorder.

Page 68 is a check the FBI did into why Ivins mentioned "SAEDA," which is "Subversion and Espionage Directed Against the United States Army."

Page 69 contains a report that Ivins visited Dr. Meryl Nass's web site at www.anthraxvaccine.org.   That site no longer exists.

There are a bunch of brief summaries of interviews.

Page 94 is a November 28, 2005 report that says Ivins got his desire to get into science as a result of reading "Microbe Hunters" by Paul de Kruif.

Page 96 is a May 5, 2005 report from the FBI checking on Ivins at the University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill.


Amerithrax Part 37.pdf (link to a link)

Page 1 is an April 4, 2006 report which says Ivins was given a Polygraph test on February 28, 2002 so that he could work on the Amerithrax evidence.


Pages 8 through 14 contain a list of 385 items "seized" during a search of USAMRIID that took place between July 16, 2004 and July 23, 2004.

Page 25 is an FBI check done around April 6, 2005, into whether or not Ivins had any insurance claims (probably for automobile accidents) in New Jersey.

Page 33 is an October 2006 request for Ivins' drivers' license photos.

Page 34 is the reply  FAX with the photo

Page 40 is an October 26, 2006 report which says:

3) Bruce Ivins is an extremely sensitive suspect in the 2001 anthrax attacks.  Source coverage of Ivins is very limited, therefore the objective of the surveillance is to gather as much intelligence as possible about Ivins' personal life.  Subject walks to work during the week and therefore the only surveillance coverage needed is during weekends.

4) The anticipated duration of the surveillance is expected to be weekends beginning approximately November 4, 2006 through December.

Page 43 says: Due to the sensitivity of MAJOR CASE 184, Amerithrax respectfully requests that ground surveillance is supported by the WFO Aviation Unit.

Page 45 has a report which says that between November 30, 2006 and December 4, 2006, the FBI examined the copy of Ivins' home computer hard drive made on March 31, 2005.

The results show that he visited some college fraternity and sorority web sites, and did searches related to kidnapping and blindfolding.  He did NOT visit my site (at that time). The list of things he searched for is kind of creepy.  He visited sites having to do with hazing, too.  Interesting stuff.  On page 48 it mentions he looked at the letter to the editor defending hazing that he submitted to the Frederick News-Post using Haigwood's name.  (The pro-hazing letter was sent in 1982.)

Page 50 is a report where the FBI contacts the author of "Broken Pledges" and gets the letter Ivins sent to him telling the author about the "Haigwood letter" to the FNP.  It says the author was previously contacted by the FBI regarding the letter but at that time wasn't able to find it.  But the author had since located it AND a copy of the letter sent to the FNP.

Pages 51 and 52 contain a handwritten letter by Ivins where he advises an anti-hazing activist of the letter to the editor supposedly sent by Nancy Haigwood to the Frederick News-Post but actually sent by Ivins.

Pages 55 to contain a lot of gossip-type comments about how people reacted to problems with the vaccine program, how they used the showers, and how Ivins knew how to operate both a fermenter and a lyophilizer. 

Page 59: IVINS was famous for sitting in people's office trash cans, using them as a chair, to talk and gossip with them.   

Page 60 from Feb. 22, 2007:  XXXX did not perceive any problems with IVINS, but described him as a "beaten puppy" who felt abused by everyone, and especially by XXXX10XXXX who used to "browbeat" IVINS scientifically.

Pages 64 through 68 appear to be an August 30, 2007 report on research done by a postal inspector into articles in the Frederick News-Post which may have mentioned Ivins.

Page 69 is an FBI report from November 19, 2007 describing when they did "surveillance and trash covers" on Ivins' home.  More reports on the same thing follow.

Page 76 is a report from December 18, 2007 where someone mentions that Ivins would bring in copies of the American Family Journal to work.

Pages 81 through 83 are a report from June 4, 2008 listing "trash covers" done at Ivins' home during April through June 2008.

Page 84 is a report from July 14, 2008, which describes gunpowder found in Ivins' home during a search on July 12.

Page 88 is a lab receipt for the gunpowder.


Amerithrax Part 38.pdf (link to a link)

Page 1 is a report of a December 19, 2005 interview with someone at Battelle, and it appears to be about some contaminated anthrax samples they received from Ivins.

Page 3 is another report from the same day on the same subject.

Page 5 is a report about a September 2004 FBI search of Battelle.

The entire file seems to be about FBI searches at Battelle.


Amerithrax Part 39.pdf (link to a link)

The entire file is about getting help from the Cryptologic and Electronic Analysis Unit (CEAU) to help them break the codes protecting some images they had found somewhere.


Amerithrax Part 40.pdf

Pages 1-5 are a report dated November 1, 2005 describing some details about Dugway's role in producing the contents of flask RMR-1029.

Page 6 is a chart showing details about creating both RMR-1030 and RMR-1029.

Pages 7 & 8 are more of the same but only about RMR-1029.   

Pages 9 - 13 are a December 7, 2006 interview with someone at Dugway about their role in creating the contents of flask RMR-1029.


Amerithrax Part 41. pdf

The file consists of reports requesting permanent storage of "evidentiary items" obtained from Bruce Ivins.  Dates Dec. 30, 2005 and May 30, 2006.


Amerithrax Part 42.pdf

Pages 5-8 are a report from March 10, 2003 about work done in Building 1412.

Page 6:  Only this year when the Dugway supply ran out did IVINS grow some spores to keep up with the research.  All the spores used in the challenges are broth grown or fermented.

Page 9 is the start of an interview from Feb. 24, 2003, where the handling of the Daschle letter is described and how Ivins got it.

Page 10:  People are being called liars ever since IVINS' swabbing incident and IVINS is getting "a bad rap" for this.

The Building and staff were not equipped to handle the letters, therefore a lot of bad decisions were made.  Some people are trying to look out for themselves and could be covering up the truth.

Page 15 has some comments from April 23, 2003 about how Ivins transported spores to building 1412 for aerosol tests.

Page 19 has more of the same from March 19, 2003.

Page 22: The plates used in the Ames Ba aersol challenges were disposed in biohazard bags.  The researchers were supposed to place these biohazard bags into another plastic bag and deposit them into steel garbage cans located in Room XXX Building XXXX.  It was possible that viable colonies of Ames Ba could have remained on the plates in the garbage bags for several weeks until disposed into the autoclave in the basement of Building XXXX.  [This is likely in Building 1412].

Page 23 contains a description of growing spores by taking a plate out of the garbage to get a sample to grow in a fermenter or flasks.


Amerithrax Part 43.pdf

Page 1 begins a March 9, 2004 interview with some anthrax expert who was interviewed at home.    His name seems to consist of 7 characters.  The entire file is that one interview.  It appears to be William Patrick III (Bill Patrick).

The interviewee does NOT appear to be anyone from USAMRIID.  He says his first involvement with the anthrax letters was at a meeting at the FBI offices. 

At the meeting XXXXXXX saw the results of initial assays conducted by two laboratories, BATTELLE Memorial Institute, and the United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID).  The BATTELLE assay put the concentration of spores at 5x10 to the 11th [500 billion] colony forming units (cfu).  The USAMRIID assay put the spore concentration at 2x10 to the 12th cfu [2 trillion?].  Particle size of the spores was also discussed.

Prior to this meeting XXXXXXX had no discussion with anyone regarding the characteristics of the anthrax in the letters.

Page 2: At the meeting the issue of the presence of electrostatic charge in the spores was discussed.  XXXXXXX questioned whether the spores were easily put into a liquid suspension.  BRUCE IVINS and XXXXXXXXXX both said that the spores were easily dissolved into solution.  XXXXXXX advised that if this was the case then the spores must not contain hydrophobic silica.

Page 2:  XXXXX asked IVINS which of the samples most closely resembled the spore contained in the anthrax-laced letter.  IVINS chose the sample of B.g. had been freeze dried and contained hydrophobic silica. 

At a much later date [Patrick] was shown the actual material mailed in the Senator LEAHY letter.  [Patrick] was at USAMRIID with FBI Special Agent (SA) XXXXX XXXXXX.  IVINS showed [Patrick] a vial containing the spores.  To [Patrick] the spores looked unremarkable.  They had good "flowability," but not remarkable "flowability."  At the meeting [Patrick] also viewed an electron micrograph of the spores.

Page 4: XXXXX stated that one person could pull off mailing the anthrax-laced letters, especially if they took prophylactic antibiotics before assembling and mailing the letters.

Page 5 contains comments about using "sterile sand" to preserve anthrax spores, and has more about Ivins' opinion about which sample matched the attack spores.

XXXXXXX showed the interviewing agents several simulants which [he] has had in [his] possession for approximately XXXXXX [7, 8, 11 or 12] years.  XXXXXXX described one bottle of B.g. as the ultimate in flyaway spores.  XXXXXXX advised that the spores contained in this bottle are of the .03 micron size and possess an electrostatic charge.  XXXXXXX shook the bottle several hours before showing it to the interviewing agents to demonstrate that the particles would remain airborne for a prolonged period of time.

A second bottle of B.g. shown to the agents was the one IVINS identified to XXXXXXX as most similar to the material which was taken from the LEAHY letter.  XXXXXXX stated that this bottle contained B.g. with silica added.  The bottle had the words "freeze dried" on it, it was Pyrex bottle number 1261.  This B.g. was freeze dried using a Dixon Generator and milled using a micronizer.  The spore concentration was 800x10 to the ninth cfu.   

Page 6:  XXXXXXX advised that spray dried material does not need to be milled.

Page 8:  XXXXXX asked what was the lowest denominator for making biological agents.  What was the minimal amount and type of instrumentation and equipment necessary to produce a biological weapon.  XXXXXXX advised that there is not much needed in equipment, space, safety and cost to make a biological agent, but that the price goes up and mistakes become more dramatic when drying the agent enters the equation.

Page 9: XXXXXXX does not believe it is possible to use a lyophilizer to create anthrax spores with the particle size of those in the anthrax-laced letters.  XXXXXXX believes that a lyophilizer would generate particles in the 12 to 18 micron range.  A smaller particle size, ranging from 3 to 5 microns would be achieved with rapid freezing and then drying of the biological agent.  A freeze drier would be used to obtain smaller particles. 

Pages 9-10: XXXX stated [he] believes it would have been easy for someone to have created the anthrax in a laboratory at USAMRIID.  XXXXXX advised that all the equipment needed to pull it off is located at USAMRIID, and someone with permission to work in the laboratories could have worked late at night making the material without drawing any suspicion.  Scientists like free movement in and out of their laboratories and work areas and do not like to be bothered with signing in and out.  Previous to recent changes, security at USAMRIID was based on this premise.  Equipment and materials could have been easily decontaminated, leaving no trail.  Dry spores could be stored anywhere, although they should be kept below 60% humidity.


Amerithrax Part 44.pdf

Pages 1 - 19 seem to be an April 28, 2002 report on someone born overseas, but so much of the report is redacted that nothing useful can be gleaned from it.

Page 2 mentions "PENTTBOMB" a.k.a. PENTTBOM, which is the FBI's investigation into the attacks of 9/11.

Page 12: This information is mentioned due to possible interest in Bruce Edwards Ivins, DOB 04/22/1946, SSAN 280-44-5449, Ohio, 1963-1964, but no relationship seems apparent between these two individuals.

Pages 20 to 26 are a report dated July 11, 2002, on an investigation of a foreign-born USAMRIID employee.  Ivins is mentioned on page 24.

Pages 27 to 37 are a November 18, 2003 report on someone who was believe to work for USAMRIID but actually works elsewhere - possibly in New Jersey, since the Fort Monmouth Information Technology Center is mentioned on page 27.

Page 35: Bruce Edwards Ivans [sic] Ph.D., USAMRIID, was interviewed on 01/31/2002, and revealed that XXXXXXX who was at XXXXXXX left USAMRIID under unfavorable conditions.

Pages 38 to 49 are a report from December 3, 2003, which also mentions the Fort Monmouth Information Technology Center.


Amerithrax Part 45:

Page 1 from a July 2, 2008 interview: In reference to two emails dated June 12, 2008, that XXXXXX had sent writer XXXX advised that after reflection of who at United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) had the capabilities to produce the anthrax used in the anthrax-laced letter mailings, XXXXXX also was thinking BRUCE [IVINS] had the capability and possibly the motive.  XXXXX noted that IVINS was a "devote Catholic" and "everyone [at USAMRIID] knew that he practiced the faith."   XXXXX opined IVINS was anti-abortion. XXXXX noted that U.S. Senators LEAHY and DASCHLE were amongst a list of pro-abortion Catholics in the U.S. Senate, and that the N.Y. Post and BROKAW were liberals towards women's rights.

Page 3 seems to be an attempt to link Ivins to a hoax anthrax letter sent to an abortion clinic in Louisville, KY, on Halloween 1998.

Page 4 is a link to an article about Catholic sentiment towards Sen. Daschle.

Pages 5-6 are the actual article from The Weekly Standard.

Pages 7-8 are an FBI report from June 4, 2008 with someone who thinks that New Horizons Iinc. might have been behind the attacks.

Page 8 has statements that the writing on the anthrax letters resembles that of Bruce Ivins.  The interviewee also describes how the spores could have been made in shaker flasks without anyone knowing about it.

Page 9 says that on July 22, 2008, the same person called the FBI agent and advised that Ivins was now in a "mental institution."


Amerithrax Part 46.pdf

Page 1 says on April 6, 2005, and FBI agent conducted Internet searches in response to information received from [probably Nancy Haigwood].  The agent checked out sites related to Kappa Kappa Gamma and found that the Princeton office of the KKG and the mailbox where the letters were mailed "were 0.03 miles apart." 

The attachment on page 6 indicates that the agent figure out it was about a 3 hour drive from Frederick.

Page 8 contains an FBI report from April 19, 2005, where an FBI agent checks on the fake letter to the editor Ivins sent in Nancy Haigwood's name to the Frederick News-Post.  He finds that the letter was also used in a college thesis.  And that thesis references the book "Broken Pledges."

Pages 11 - 13 are parts of the thesis by Chad William Ellsworth.  They show the reference to "Broken Pledges" was on page 93 of the thesis.

Page 14 is the cover of "Broken Pledge" and pages 15 and 16 contain pages from the book, but the information about Nancy Haigwood seems to be redacted.

Pages 17 to 20 appear to be an April 19, 2005 interview with Nancy Haigwood.

Page 19:  [Haigwood] cannot believe that IVINS has acted normally at work throughout the years.  [She] believes that IVINS was a "strange guy" on the far side of weird, even for a scientist.  [Haigwood] never heard IVINS make any anti-government remarks.

[Haigwood] feels that the mailing of the anthrax-laced letters was an act of an individual "showing off."  [Haigwood] believes that the incidents involving KKG were done to show off and to get attention.

Page 21 is an October 7, 2005, report on an FBI contact with the Montgomery County (MD) police department to check on what appears to be an auto theft report made by Bruce Ivins.

Pages 24 to 26 are a January 31, 2007 FBI interview with some woman Ivins once knew who still gets occasional emails from him.  It's someone who never worked with Ivins but who did work at USAMRIID at some point in time.

Pages 27 to 29 are a March 14, 2007, interview with someone who got an email from Ivins where Ivins apparently attached the fake Haigwood letter to the editor.  She says she never met Ivins.

Page 30 is a March 28, 2007 report about someone who got KKG materials from Ivins.

Pages 31 to 34 are an April 24, 2007 report that is almost entirely redacted but seems to be an interview with the same person who got the KKG materials from Ivins.   


Amerithrax Part 47 of 59:

Pages 1 and 2 are a brief interview from Feb. 6, 2002 with someone who knew Ivins.  On page two the interviewee says "Ivins has always been somewhat unstable."

Page 3 is the start of another interview from Feb. 7, 2002, where Ivins is described as "unstable.  Someone contacted the FBI to tell them about Ivins and anthrax.  Page 4 suggests the person was in email contact with Ivins.

Page 11 is a report from July 7, 2004 where someone tells the FBI that "it was common for employees to skip the shower [when leaving a hot suite]."

Lots of uninteresting interviews with USAMRIID personnel.

Page 23 is dated Feb. 9, 2006, but is a report on a polygraph test that Ivins took on Feb. 28, 2002 - four years earlier.

Page 24 says "Therefore, it is recommended that Ivins be retested if he has not otherwise been eliminated as a suspect."

Page 26 is an April 6, 2005 report regarding Ivins' Feb. 2002 polygraph test.

Page 31 is an April 26, 2005 FBI report where the Newark Field Office is asked to look into what the KKG office in Princeton is all about, and if they have ever received any threatening letters.  Page 32 asks that the Princeton Police be contacted to see if they have any records regarding Ivins.

Page 36 is an April 4, 2005 interview with someone.  The FBI wanted to learn the origin of Ivins' nickname "King Badger."

Page 37 says "On October 25, 1999, IVINS sent an email message to XXX8XXXX which contained the statements "I have come to learn, much to my surprise and disappointment, that [she] has been saying some very negative things about me to people here behind my back.  Apparently I am being made to appear either mentally ill or just plain mean".

IVINS never offered any evidence to support his statements.  XXXXXXX believed the paranoid statements derived from IVINS' lack of self esteem and a worry that his friends were not really his friends.

In a follow-up email message on October 27, 1999, IVINS wrote "Losing [her] as someone I can spill my guts to is crushing - it would mean I am truly alone - completely alone."  [This is obviously after Mara Linscott quit.]

Page 39 mentions Ivins' "black cloud" days when he was in a bad mood, circa 1999, about the time Mara Linscott was leaving.

Page 40, apparently from an Oct. 16-17, 2001 email exchange: IVINS often pointed out that there were no such things as "military grade" anthrax spores.  He stated that they were purified spores, but did not lyophilize the spores.  According to IVINS, there was not a way to look at the spore preparation and characterize it as either "military grade" or not "military grade."

Page 43 mentions a March 13, 2001 email where Ivins mentions the detergent he sent to someone.  The report is from April 4, 2005.

Page 44 (apparently from an email): Sometimes (most of the time) I really don't get his motives behind anything he does.  And I think there are motives most of the time.  It's a little scary actually to think he drove all the way up there in the middle of the night just to drop off a package."

[Linscott?] did not find it strange that IVINS lied about the event.  However, [she] did find it strange that he made the delivery in the first place.

Page 45 has an email from 2003 or 2003 where Ivins worries about people talking ill of him, and about him saying one thing and others saying something else, indicating to the FBI that someone is lying.

Page 47 talks about Ivins going through a transformation from a strict Catholic who hates the idea of abortions to someone more mellow.  He starts getting interested in cats.  It says Ivins dyed his hair and mustache, but the next page says he never died his hair or mustache while working at USAMRIID.  Summaries of emails from after 9/11 follow.

Page 50 contains an interesting poem by Ivins and more about his mental health.

Pages 51-52 are an FBI report from May 16, 2005 where the results of questioning of KKG in Princeton and searching of the Princeton Police Department records are described.  {Nothing about Ivins.}

Page 52 says several times that Princeton does not recognize fraternities or sororities on campus.

Lots of FBI reports from 2006 checking into Ivins emails follow.  They also talk with people who were apparently on a "buddy list" maintained by Ivins, but they never heard of him.


Amerithrax Part 48.pdf

Page 3 is from a Feb. 5, 2007 FBI report and describes in detail the additional security measures at USAMRIID that were added after 9/11 and the anthrax mailings.  

Page 6 has the interviewee saying he'll be waiting for an apology from the FBI when they find that the culprit did NOT work at USAMRIID.

Page 10 says that all computers are "switched out" every three years.  The hard drives are destroyed and the other equipment is stored in a warehouse somewhere.

Page 11 begins a June 17, 2004, FBI interview with a female with an 8 character last name who was in a management position at the time of the attacks.

Page 14 starts a June 2, 2006 interview with a female who mentions that Ivins had some kind of outside of work connection with someone else at USAMRIID, but she didn't think it was romantic.  It might have to do with them both being Catholic.

Page 16 begins an April 13, 2007 interview with someone in the military [apparently female] who works at USAMRIID and bitches that the civilians at USAMRIID don't have the right attitude.

Page 20 has a statement were Ivins is described as church-going and a strict Catholic.

IVINS often discussed the Right to Life movement and [his wife's] involvement.  XXXX recalled IVINS discussing hat types of things to give up for Lent and recalled a bumper sticker.  The concept of viability was discussed.  XXXXX does not know how active the IVINS's are on the Right to Life movement, but knows IVINS's position is that life begins at conception.

According to XXXXX, IVINS drinks while he is out socially, but does not drink at home.  IVINS is a "lightweight," gets very hyper, and is a high energy person.  IVINS has made his own foot fungus powder and used lab equipment for drinking water.


Amerithrax Part 49.pdf

Page 5 begins a March 17, 2008 FBI report about Ivins' computer usage.

IVINS appeared to use the internet extensively to explore interests that did not appear to be directly related to his work.  IVINS's internet activity diminished significantly after 11/01/2007 [when his home was searched], and by 2008 had ceased altogether.

Page 7 is an August 14, 2008 report [after Ivins' suicide] about Ivins using a computer extensively recently.


Amerithrax Part 50.pdf 

This entire file consists of a 3 page FBI report dated December 20, 2001, reporting on an interview with a male, probably Joseph Farchaus.  On page 3, Farchaus indicates that "the individual involved was likely a male of Middle-Eastern decent."  Most of the report is redacted.


Amerithrax Part 51.pdf

Page 1 begins a 6-page November 26, 2001 FBI report which says the person the report is about was under surveillance beginning November 22, but there was no pertinent activity.   Apparently the file is relevant only because Ivins was one of the people who knew the guy under surveillance -- probably Farchaus.


Amerithrax Part 52.pdf

Page 1 begins a December 10, 2001 FBI report of an interview with someone.  The only significance seems to be that Ivins is mentioned on page 2 in regard to an email.

Page 5 begins an April 25, 2002 interview with someone who talks about Ivins doing some unauthorized swabbing after the contamination incident.

Pages 7 to 13 are a November 19, 2002 interview with someone [female] who knows about Ivins and someone else analyzing the contents of the Daschle letter.  Probably Pat Worsham.  The report contains a lot of discussion of when gloves are worn and not worn when handling things in the labs.  There's also discussion about masks that are worn and when they are worn. 

Page 10:  [Worsham] reviewed the steps that [she] went through to gain access to the lab.  [She] entered the change room through the door on the cold side and removed [her] clothes there.  [She] would put XXXX scrubs and socks on, and bouffant caps were available for those who did not want to wash their hair when they showered after exiting the hot side.  [She] would enter [her] pin number and go through the airlock walkway to the hot side.  This pin was necessary to gain access to the hot side of [B4].  Once [she] was on the hot side, [she] would put shoes on, open the door to the lab and enter.

Page 11 has more information about the color of the scrubs and how scrubs and towels are handled.

Page 15 is a report from Sept. 16, 2003, which seems mostly about gloves and ziplock bags - where they are stored and who uses them.

Page 16 is about the work Ivins and others did to irradiate spores for Dugway.

Page 17 has details about access to the animal rooms and how animals are bled.

Page 24 has a lot of information about Mikesell.

Page 27 is a report from Feb. 2004 which says, "MIKESELL left behind his entire culture collection when he departed from USAMRIID."

Page 32 indicates that "the autoclave in the basement" is in the basement of building 1412.

Page 38 from Sept. 17, 2004, says that the "Amerithrax III office" was "located at 4640 Wedgewood Boulevard, Frederick, MD, 21703.

Page 39 has questions about the source of the spores sent to Dugway in 1997.

Page 42 has information about autoclaves.  There was on big one used mainly by the animal caretakers and two small ones used by everyone else.

The small autoclaves were nonfunctional approximately 50 percent of the times XXXX attempted to use them.  When both small autoclaves were nonfunctional, XXXX put [her] material back in the biosafety cabinet.  XXXXX never tried to use the large autoclave.

Page 46 begins a seven page March 31, 2005 FBI interview with someone who is surprised to learn that flask RMR-1029 contains spores with DNA identical to the attack letters.  She thinks that Dugway might have kept some of the spores used in the flask, so someone from Dugway could have been the mailer.  [Could be Pat Fellows.]          

Page 48 makes it clear that the FBI is trying to find out more about Bruce Ivins and that he's a suspect in the case.  The interview is with someone who knew about Ivins fascination with Mara Linscott, but didn't think Ivins could be the anthrax mailer.  The interviewee also thinks Bioport had a lot to gain from the attacks.

XXXXX would be suspicious of a Bioport employee as having written the note.  XXXX feels that because of the level of incompetence and lack of understanding of microbiology displayed by Bioport staff, "They wouldn't know that today you take Cipro for an anthrax exposure, not penicillin."

Page 51:  XXXX stated that with regard to IVINS' late night activity at USAMRIID after 9/11/01, IVINS must have been checking on animals.  Evening visits to check on animals was common.

XXXXX found it "odd" that IVINS drove to XXXXXXXXXXX and back to Frederick, Maryland one evening to XXXXXXXXX leave a bottle of whine [sic] on XXXXXX porch.  XXXXX believes IVINS did so purely as a gesture of friendship.

Page 52: XXX7XXX again reiterated that [she] believes IVINS had nothing to do with the anthrax attacks.  XXX7XXX did not believe IVINS was under the influence of any medication that would effect his work or judgment.  XXX7XXX stated that IVINS had talked about his mother being "nuts' and struggled with mental challenges.  IVINS worried that this problem might be hereditary and that he might one day become mentally unstable.  XXXX stated that [she] did not know of IVINS ever having any kind of extramarital affair.  IVINS often expressed an extreme dislike for "sorority-type" girls.

Page 54 begins an FBI report dated Feb. 27, 2007, regarding key-card access records at USAMRIID from 9/11/2001 "until the anthrax-laced letter mailings of 2001."

Page 55 mentions two "windows of opportunity."  The first was evidently from 9/11 to 9/17/2001.  The report makes it clear that whoever their checking on was NOT Bruce Ivins and the person did a lot of "piggy-backing" to get in and out of areas where key-cards are used.  Could be Pat Fellows, since the name has 7 characters.

Page 73 is part of an April 3, 2007 FBI report.  It says: The original shipment of Dugway spores was in the form of a paste.

Page 76: Animal space was in short supply at USAMRIID, so USAMRIID would supply vaccine to Covance, and in turn Covance vaccinated and bled the animals, then shipped them back to USAMRIID.

Covance did not have any Bio Safety Level-3 (BSL-3) laboratories.

Page 77: Bioport didn't make spores, they just participated in colony count enumeration.  Also, they did not use the Ames strain for potency issues.

According to XXX7XXX Bioport would take diluted material and put it on the plate, then pour molten agar on top and incubate it.  Consequently, they had problems with colony counts.   ........  believed their problem was they were still using growth processes that came about in the 1970's when the vaccine came about.  [She] believed this was because they didn't have a lot of "fresh blood" in the laboratory, therefore USAMRIID was showing them basic microbiology.  

XXXXXXX was shown IVINS' B3 hot suite records for the month of September, broken down into daytime hours versus nighttime hours.  ..... [She] was surprised at the amount of time IVINS spent in the suite.  [She] could think of a reason why he was in the hot suites late at night.  According to [her], the work wouldn't take that long, it should only take about 20 minutes not hours.

XXXXXXX believe IVINS spent extra time in the hot suites for a couple of reasons.  One reason is that IVINS would use the internet in the suite.  About a year ago, IVINS told XXX7XXX that he liked blindfolded women sites and long-haired women sites.  IVINS loved women with long hair.  Another reason IVINS spent time in the lab was because he was unhappy at home.

Page 78: Also, IVINS was frugal, and when he was at USAMRIID he could get free hot water.

Page 78 also goes into details about Ivins mental problems and that he seemed to take up drinking after Mara Linscott left.

Page 81 is the start of an April 5, 2007 interview with someone who remembers Ivins telling people how he broke into a KKG office and stole a code book.  Plus, he kept a post office box somewhere which he used to communicate with someone.

Page 87 is a June 8, 2007 report where Ivins is describe as "a basket case" and exhibiting "panic hysteria behavior" on the phone.

Page 91 is an April 19, 2007 report where someone says they thought that the Dugway spore supply was being added to routinely.  But the record doesn't show any new spores being added.

Page 95 is the end of an August 27, 2007 report in which someone says that Ivins was an expert on ZIP codes.

In early 2008 the FBI was getting Ivins emails from various people with whom Ivins had exchange emails.

Page 103 is a report that says it's from January 14, 2007, but it was transcribed on Feb. 18, 2008, so it's probably from 2008.  Yes, at the bottom is says January 14, 2008.  It's apparently another interview with Pat Fellows.

[Fellows] also provided a thick paperback book; Godel, Escher, Bach: an Eternal Golden Braid.  The book was a gift XXXXXXXX from IVINS, back in the 2006-2007 time-frame.  IVINS wanted [her] to read the book and on occasion would inquire as to [her] status on reading it.  [Fellows] only briefly read a few pages and had no desire to read the book in its entirety.  Because of this IVINS seemed a little disenchanted with [her] for not reading the book and offering [her] insight; and at some point he asked [her] for the book back.  [Fellows] could not understand the book and never finished it, nor did [she] give the book back to him.

Page 106 is another report of an interview with Fellows on Feb. 15, 2008, in which she indicates that Ivins also gave her copies of "AMERITHRAX: The Hunt for the Anthrax Killer" and "Vaccine A."

More reports of people providing email they received from Ivins.

Page 116 is a report from November 16, 2007 when someone gave the FBI a copy of Ivins' November 19, 2005 email to himself (KingBadger7@aol.com) titled "New Thoughts and Theories on the Anthrax Letter Attacks."  The email lays out 12 points IVINS believed to be why [Fellows?] and/or [Mara Linscott] may have been involved in the anthrax letter attacks.

Page 119 is a report dated June 2, 2008, where Fellows informed the FBI of a call she'd just received from Ivins.  IVINS apologized to [her] again for his behavior, asking for [her] to forgive him.  He informed [her] that as an outcome of him being away, he found out he was an alcoholic and drug addict.  [Fellows] was surprised because [she] was under the impression that he was away for mental health reasons.  He also mentioned that he had periods of black outs in the past.


Amerithrax Part 53.pdf

Page 3 is the start of a Feb. 1, 2008 report on problems with lab contamination.   Morphological variants are mentioned on pages 6 and 7.

Page 9 is part of a Jan. 19, 2007 report which says that "piggy backing" was common prior to 9/11 for going in and out of the building, but NOT in the labs.

Page 14 has someone's lengthy thoughts about Ivins from Jan. 19, 2007. 

Pages 17 to 21 contain a day by day "possible explanation" from someone on Ivins' evening and weekend hours in the B3 lab from September 12, 2001 through October 8, 2001.

Pages 25 to are a report from June 19, 2008 which describes how the investigation affected people at USAMRIID.  It mentions the morphs.  The interviewee gives a lot of possible excuses for Ivins unusual nighttime hours.  He may have had a hard time sleeping after 9/11, so he would come in to work ... etc.

Page 30: IVINS told XXXXXXX that he put a poster on [her] door that something to the effect of "FBI Rat."

Ivins attitude toward abortion and the death penalty are discussed.  The interviewee says he doesn't recall ever seeing the American Family Association Journal in the hot suites.

Page 31 contains a lot of excuses for why Ivins may have done things.


Amerithrax Part 54.pdf

This file seems to begin with interviews with people who can be more or less eliminated as suspects.

Page 9 is an FBI interview from Jan. 5, 2003, where the FBI is trying to find some document which proves that the interviewee could not have driven to New Jersey on September 17 or 18, 2001.

Page 10 does the same thing for October 6 to 9, 2001.

The June 14, 2004 report that begins on page 51 seems to be an exception in that it doesn't say anything about having no reason to think the person could be a suspect.  (On page 53 the interviewee talked about ways to weaponize anthrax.)  There are other exceptions which indicate that it may be more of an FBI agent's personal style as to whether he writes a "no further investigation suggested" at the end of the report.

Page 78 is a report from June 22, 2004, which says: XXXXXX remembered IVINS' room having two (2) weeks worth of trash in it at times.  XXXXXXXXXXX and noticed the amount of trash.  There were often plates lying around IVINS lab and the incubator was often full of plates.   [This MAY be from when Ivins worked in building 1412.]

Page 89 from Sept. 17, 2004: At one time the commanders of USAMRIID were concerned about the deaths of vaccinated Non-Human Primates [NHP], following Ba exposures.  According to XXXXX, the staff at USAMRIID was prohibited from working with Ba Ames for one (1) or two (2) years.  A study conducted by XXXXXXXXXXX showed that Ba Ames overcame the vaccination used at the time.

Page 94 is a report from Sept. 30, 2004 where the FBI wants to know what kind of purchases Ivins made at a service station on Sept. 17.  But, they also note that "Rosemont Service Center maintains credit card purchase records for both gasoline and repair or service for approximately three to four year.  These records are kept on thermal paper, which can be difficult to read.  XXXX advised that any subpoenas sent to Rosemont Service Center should be sent to [his] attention.

Page 107 is an FBI report from January 3, 2005 where they are examining Bruce Ivins prescription purchases at Weis Pharmacy #110 located at 199 Thomas Jefferson Drive.  He also had made purchases at Theracom Incorporated at 6931 Arlington Road, Suite T20, Bethesda, MD.

Pages 109 to 113 are a report dated Dec. 10, 2004 ABOUT the investigation of Bruce Ivins.

Page 112: IVINS' house was the subject of a positive scent dog hit in 2002.

They are also looking for someone who bought the plastic container found during the 2002 pond search.

The report ends by saying that the investigation of Ivins is "ongoing."

Page 114 is a report of an interview on Jan. 28, 2005 with a male who works at USAMRIID.  Last name is 5 characters long.  Probably Henry Heine. 

[Heine] believes that BRUCE IVINS is very close to having a "nervous" breakdown due to the stress that the AMERITHRAX investigation is putting on him.

[He] believes that the searches conducted at USAMRIID in 2004 by the FBI was a publicity stunt in order to prove to the country that progress is being made on the investigation.  [Heine] also indicated that the search disrupted [his] research projects, causing 4 months loss of productivity.

Page 127 from a report dated Jan. 25, 2005 indicates that a janitor might turn on the autoclave and clean up the results.

Page 129: IVINS' office had a floor shaker to use for 5 Liter flasks.

Page 131: XXXXX described IVINS as a "penny pincher" who was "caught in the 30's."  [Evidently meaning his thinking was from the time of the Great Depression.]

Page 135 describes a May 26, 2005 investigation into Ivins' cell phone records.  He had 90 unique numbers in his cell phone from incoming and outgoing calls.

Page 137 from May 26, 2005 says that there were 16 unique numbers used from Ivins' home phone.

Pages 145 through 232 are an April 20, 2006 spreadsheet report which lists "all persons of interest (POI) who have either been investigated or are currently being investigated for their possible connection to the anthrax mailings of 2001.  The first batch of columns seems to end on page 186 where another batch of columns begins.

Page 170 shows Oliver Mikesell's name unredacted.

Page 188 has the name "Richard Baker" because he died January 11, 2001.

Page 207 has the name "Frederick Knauert," another guy who is deceased.

Page 209 has the name "David Leatherman" also deceased.

Page 212 another deceased person, "Gilcin F. Meadors."

The unredacted names show that the list is in alphabetical order.

Page 213 - Mikesell again - different column headings.

Page 231 seems to have column TOTALS.  (25 persons of interest, 21 with motive, 1095 total people investigated)

Page 233 contains a report from Aug. 1, 2005 which says: The major focus of this analysis is to attempt to determine if enough information was available to make an objective assessment of Bruce Ivins from a personality perspective.

Once it was determined that the communications id contain adequate relevant indicators of Ivins' behavioral composite, a more definitive Personality Assessment of Bruce Ivins was pursued.  Apparent components of Ivins' personality were noted which led to the development of a specific interview strategy concerning Bruce Ivins for possible future contacts by AMERITHRAX personnel.

Page 235 shows they found 2 "experts' is in forensic psychology and forensic psychiatry to review the information.

Page 253 is an analysis of Bruce Ivins' phone calls for February 2005.

Page 256 is a report of a search done of Ivins' office in room 19 on March 31, 2005.

Page 257 is a report from April 7, 2005 on collecting emails between Ivins' and someone else.

Page 280 contains a report about an examination on Dec. 16, 2006 of a package Ivins mailed to someone.  The postage was $13.20.

Page 283 from a November 29, 2006 interview: IVINS was a nice guy but a bit strange like a "scientist you see in the funny papers."  He wore a tie with tennis shoes and was boisterous.


Amerithrax Part 55.pdf

Page 1 is a July 26, 2004, report: To request the Chemical-Biological Sciences Unit (CBSU), [to] develop a method for detecting the use of Renograffin/RenoCal/Hypaque for spore purification and phenol for spore storage and stablilization.

They evidently hadn't yet figured out that the attack spores were made on plates.

Pages 5 to 12 are a Sept. 11, 2006, report: To summarize the association of ten Bacillus anthracis samples acquired during searches conducted at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) and Battelle with RMR-1029.  Details for each of the ten samples are provided.

Page 18 is an Oct. 4, 2006 report on Ivins' use of hypaque gradient purification methods.

Pages 25 to 26 are an explanation of why the sample from RMR-1029 that Ivins supposedly sent to the University of New Mexico didn't contain the 4 mutations. 

There are a number of explanations for this observation, including: 1) The sample provided to UNM was not actually RMR-1029; 2) There was a sampling error at some point in the supply chain of this sample, in other words the sample size was sufficiently small such that the genetically different spores were not part of the sample; 3) All three assays resulted in false negatives.

Page 26: The form 11R was completed and approved on 03/02/2001, five days before the sample was actually shipped.  This allows for the possibility that IVINS initially planned on sending RMR-1029 to UNM, however, when it came time to prepare the sample for shipment a stock other than RMR-1029 was used and the change was never noted on form 11R.  Also if RMR-1029 was used it should have been recorded on the inventory log at the time the sample was removed from RMR-1029 and not three years later.

Page 46 is a copy of form 11R for the UNM shipment.

Page 47 begins an April 2007 analysis of Ivins' notebooks in response to a grand jury subpoena.  Information about the notebooks continues through page 58.

Page 63 says that on June 12, 2007, the FBI sent a coffee cup and a soda can used by Ivins to the FBI labs.

Pages 65 and 66 seem to be an April 5, 2007 attempt to figure out when and where the four mutations occurred. 

Page 66: A review of the results of the genetic screening of FBIR samples suggests time points at which specific mutations may have arisen.  Specifically, the A1 mutation was found in Ba material transferred to the U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, in 1992 and 1997 from USAMRIID.  These spores containing the A1 mutation were originally transferred to Dugway Proving Ground by Dr. Bruce Ivins, Bacteriology Division.  In addition, material collected from USAMRIID dated 03/01/1991, tested positive for the A1 mutation.  In contrast to the A1 results, no samples positive for the A3 mutation are known to exist predating the compilation of RMR-1029 in October of 1997.  Gathering additional information about samples with single and double mutation matches could present investigators with a better understanding of where and when the A1 and A3 mutations arose. [Probably NOT true]

Page 68 is an FBI report (apparently from June 10, 2008) which mention the Bacillus subtilis contamination in the NY Post powder.  They don't seem to provide test results, but the report on pages 71 & 72 might.  Then there are 31 pages of sample data.  As far as I can tell, no match was found between the Bs found in the Post letter an any other Bs sample.

Page 111 is the start of a June 26, 2008 report: To provide a summary of investigation of the Bacillus anthracis (Ba) spore collection known as RMR-1029.

Page 115 contains a chart showing information about the creation of the contents of flasks RMR-1030 AND RMR-1029 that I think I've seen elsewhere.

Pages 117 and 118 seem to be an explanation of each line entry in the RMR-1029 inventory log, plus some details added by AMX investigators.

Page 119 has more information about the creation of flask RMR-1029.


Amerithrax Part 56 of 59.pdf

Page 2 of an interview from Feb. 2007 says once again that computers from USAMRIID hot suites were changed out/upgraded every three years, which presumably means they were replaced with computers that had been upgraded.

Page 3: According to XXXXX, there was one particular group that did not like the biological defense work done at USAMRIID and other facilities and who thought there was no real threat of the offensive use of biological agents such as anthrax.   XXXXXX thought the group was called the Committee of Responsible Physicians and its most vocal member was XXXXXXXX.  Group members would show up at anthrax conferences and publicly disputed the perception that biological weapons, specifically anthrax, present any real threat.  XXXXXX noted that the group, and XXXXXX "disappeared" after 9/11 and the 2001 anthrax attacks.


Amerithrax Part 57 of 59.pdf

Page 1 is the start of a March 20, 2002 FBI interview where Bruce Ivins is also present in addition to the person being interviewed.

At the time of IVINS' arrival at USAMRIID, scientists at USAMRIID were attempting to perform aerosol challenge experiments for vaccine testing.  The preparations of B. anthracis spores being used were not pure, and the impurities in the preparations clogged the aerosolizer(s).  IVINS used density gradients to purify chlamydia preparations when IVINS was working in North Carolina, and applied the technique to purification of B. anthracis spores.  

The clogging problem was also alleviated by growing the B. anthracis in liquid broth instead of agar plates.

Page 2 contains more details about the difficulty of producing pure spores: ten liters of liquid broth are required to produce one gram of pure spores.

Page 8 starts a January 4, 2005 report "to request permanent charge out of items of evidence listed."  The items seem to relate to Bruce Ivins.  Page 10 says: These items have been destroyed or necessarily consumed during the course of analysis and will not be returned to WFO.  WFO requests that these items be permanently charged out from the Evidence Control inventory.

Page 17 is a May 12, 2005 report about "gene disruption experiments" involving a plasmid designated pE03, which seems to cause mutations.

Page 19 is an August 17, 2006, "To request USPIS National Forensic Laboratory conduct handwriting examination of photographs of biological sample test tube labels obtained from" USAMRIID.  They want to know if the three labels were all written by the same person.

Page 21 is a September 13, 2006 response to the handwriting analysis request. Page 23: In the report, the USPIS Laboratory concluded that the same writer produced the hand printed labels described above.

Page 24 is the actual USPIS lab report.  It's dated Aug. 17, 2006.

Page 31 is another USPIS lab report, this one dated Jan. 11, 2007.  It says:


Determine whether or not the questioned entries appearing on the "anthrax" envelopes and letters (photographic copies retained at the laboratory) were written by Bruce E. Ivins, whose known writings are depicted in the photocopies of various course of business documents.


Bruce E. Ivins probably did not write the writings appearing on the "anthrax" envelopes and letters.


The qualified findings expressed above are due to the lack of original documents from which the examination and comparisons were conducted.  The submission of the original questioned and known writings could provide for more definitive findings.  In addition, the submission of known exemplars reflecting the writings appearing on the "anthrax" envelopes and letters would need to be examined prior to fully eliminating Bruce E. Ivins as the writer of these questioned writings.

Page 36 begins an April 7, 2008, report about a fingerprint analysis of a bunch of glass tubes.

Page 43 contains an FBI request to the USPIS director asking them to re-check the writings on the anthrax documents with some additional examples of Ivins handwriting.

Page 46 begins a March 11, 2008, FBI request to its Cryptanalysis and Racketeering Records Unit (CRRU):

Page 47:  In support of the AMERITHRAX investigation, Laboratory Division, Cryptanalysis and Racketeering Records Unit (CRRU) is requested to conduct all logical analysis of the [KKG] Cipher and its possible application to the letters and envelopes used in the 2001 mailings.  In addition to the application of the Cipher to the mailings, CRRU is also requested to consider and advise the AMERITHRAX Task Force of other possible applications of the Cipher to this crime, in light of IVINS's obsession with KKG and interest in codes.

Page 48 says the same thing using different phrasing.

The file ends with bad photocopies of the letters and envelopes.


Amerithrax Part 58 of 59.pdf

Pages 1 thru 12 are an FBI report erroneously dated Feb. 16, 2001 (probably s/b 2002) "To report results on data queries on Dr. Bruce E. Ivins."

Page 4 shows that part of the report seems to be the result of an interview with Nancy Haigwood.  Female, and last name has 8 characters.

The rest of the report is a bunch of interviews from late 2001 and early 2002.

Page 13 begins a July 10, 2002, FBI report where they try to get some information on someone who knows Ivins.  They search databases for people with the same name.  They check out others who live at the same address.  Etc.

Page 26 begins a July 18, 2002, FBI report about someone else who works at USAMRIID.

The rest of the FBI file seems to consist of analysis reports from the Pocatello Information Technology Center obtained by the Amerithrax XXX team.  Most information is redacted, and what isn't redacted seems to be mostly repetition of things from other reports.


Amerithrax Part 59 of 59.pdf

This FBI file begins with more of what was at the end of the previous file: analysis reports from the Pocatello Information Technology Center obtained by the Amerithrax XXX team.

Page 33 is the start of a May 12, 2003 file "To report results of database queries on Oliver H. Mikesell (deceased)."

Page 39: Mikesell was a retired U.S. Army Major, spending most of his military career as a research scientist at USAMRIID, Ft. Detrick, Maryland.  Mikesell was named Army Scientist of the year in 1983 for his work on Louis Pasteur's strain of bacillus anthracis.  Mikesell was also the first to discover and sequence the DNA of he deadly toxins in the bacteria, thus leading to possible viable vaccine in the future.  After Mikesell's retirement from the military, he worked at Battelle Memorial Institute in Columbus, Ohio, as a research scientist in the National Defense and Security Division.

Page 54 mentions a Jan 30, 2002, interview with someone with a 7 letter name:  XXXXXXX stated that it is not difficult to grow Ba.  The difficulty lies in processing the spores.  It has to be dried and ground to get it small enough to be easily dispersed.  Then the spores have to be associated with a negative charge in order to be distributed through the air.  The whole process would be very dangerous and XXXXXXX does not have the actual working knowledge of each step.

Pages 74 and 75 have a summary of some other report from Sept. 4, 2002, which says: Once the tubes and plates in the incubator had been checked for colonies, they would have been placed in a garbage bag under one of the hoods to be autoclaved.  XXXXXX advised that they could have sat in the bag for weeks.